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Drawing from the discursive-performative theoretical approach to the populism/anti-populism 
divide, this thesis offers a first-time attempt to measure anti-populism at the individual-level, as 
well as an exploration of its correlates. Using a primary cross-sectional web-based mode survey 
conducted between April 14th and June 10th, 2020, with a sample of 305 students and researchers 
from Swiss Universities, we were able to identify two latent factors of anti-populism: Anti Right-
Wing Populism, which had a greater prevalence in our sample, and Anti Left-Wing Populism, with 
a rather neutral score. With regard to the correlates, we used hierarchical multiple regression 
analyses to test 17 variables grouped in six blocks associated with our exploratory hypotheses: 
(H1) socio-demographic; (H2) populism dimensions, elitism, and pluralism; (H3) media trust, 
(H4) Covid-19 outbreak impressions; (H5) democratic deficit and political support; and (H6) 
organizing principles. In general, our sample results suggest that populist attitudes were inversely 
correlated to both factors of Anti-Populism. Elitism and National News Media Trust also proved 
to be associated with the dependent variables, but with different directionality. Moreover, a greater 
sense of democratic deficit and blame attribution to Institutions for the Covid-19 spread had a 
positive effect on Anti Right-Wing Populism, while for Anti Left-Wing Populism, the effect was 
negative. Similarly, egalitarianism diverges in its directionality as it relates to left- or right-wing 
variables of anti-populism. Although exploratory and limited by a convenience sample, this work 
provides grounds and insights for future and more comprehensive research on anti-populism. 
 
Keywords: anti-populism, populism, discursive-performative, cross-sectional survey, factor 








Attention to populism, as a concept and as a phenomenon, has consistently increased around the 
world. Notably, the year 2016 marks a point in which it gained predominance in contemporary 
politics, media coverage, and scientific research.  
A minimal definition of populism explains it as a simplified view on society that 
distinguishes between two antagonistic camps: “the people” and “the elite.” “The people” is a 
function of a vague construction of society attained to interpretations and the implications of 
current contextual realities, while “the elite” captures those that hold leading and privileged 
positions, which are considered to work against the general will or sovereignty of the people 
(Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 12–16). 
Some compelling evidence that reveals the current increased public interest on the topic 
can be found in the production of scientific publications around populism. For instance, in Web of 
Science Core Collection1, 59.4% of the total indexed publications on the topic concentrate between 
2016 and April 2020, while the remaining 40.6% distribute along 61 years (1900-2015). A similar 
pattern is found in Google Trends2 data, where the popularity of populism queries peaked (i.e., 
ranked with maximum value 100) between November 2016 and March 2017, and continued to 
show the highest search interest scores in the following months when compared with previous 




1 Web of Science Core Collection: https://clarivate.com/webofsciencegroup/solutions/web-of-science-core-collection/ 
(search performed in April, 20th, 2020) 
2 Google Trends analyzes the popularity of queries over time in the Google search engine (i.e., 2004 - 
onward). “Numbers represent search interest relative to the highest point on the chart for the given region 






Source: (Google, 2020). 
Figure 1. Populism search trend in Google (2004-2020) 
  
When looking into the content of the information around populism, we find that it is 
associated with a wide range of contexts, circumstances, and subjects. Populism poses as a 
theoretical lens describing, comparing, and making connections between profoundly distinctive 
instances, from violent authoritarian leaders to referendum processes in democratic countries.  
 Different actors used it to diagnose all sorts of known and emergent movements, as well 
as to label parties and politicians across the ideological spectrum, from social movements like 
Occupy Wall Street (USA) and political parties like Alternative für Deutschland (Germany) and 
Podemos (Spain) to political figures like Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Bernie Sanders in the 
USA.  It is ambivalently portrayed from a positive and a negative perspective, giving room for 
arguments in its defense and approval or condemnation and rejection.  
An interesting example of this ambivalence is given by the former president of the United 
States, Barack Obama. In June 2016, when questioned about the populist campaign of the 
Republican candidate Donald Trump. Obama argued that populism "…has to do with protecting 
the little guy against powerful corporate interests, guaranteeing educational opportunity 
regardless of wealth, and ensuring a fair shake for workers. ‘I suppose that makes me a 
populist’…" (Von Drehle, 2016).  
A year later (June 2017), on a keynote address to the Montreal Board of Trade, he warned 
against the populism appeal, arguing about the linkages between the cultivation of cynicism and 
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distrust towards democratic institutions, and the turn to populist alternatives that "may not actually 
deliver." (Kilpatrik, 2017).  
Such different adaptations and arguments mirrored into the journalistic coverage, political 
discourse, and scientific research, have been problematized as conceptual stretching and catch-
all use of the term — that is, "…broadening the boundaries of the concept to include an ever-
increasing number of empirical referents without reducing its properties…" (Pappas, 2016, p. 9). 
However, besides suggesting a methodological and conceptual problematic, the ambivalent 
interpretation of populism also asserts to the active use of the term as a signifier, by purposefully 
giving it "different meanings and normative inflections depending on the context within which it 
appears…" (De Cleen et al., 2018, p. 3). 
This perspective allows exploring the idea that the populist hype is fueled by the antagonist 
dynamic and mutual rhetorical constitution between populism and anti-populism in which different 
actors advocate for particular interests by giving convenient meanings to populism.  
Anti-populism is the concrete antagonistic political logic that criticizes, discredits, and 
disregards what is considered or intentionally signified as populism. It entails articulating a 
position against populism from which to defend existing norms, regimes, and power relations 
discursively associated with liberal democracy (De Cleen et al., 2018; Moffitt, 2018; Stavrakakis 
& Katsambekis, 2019, pp. 1–3). 
 For instance, Tony Blair, Former Prime Minister of Great Britain, has been actively 
campaigning against populism. Especially, by means of the Institute for Global Change, Blair has 
led a discourse that targets populism as one of the biggest challenges and dangers to democracy. 
Organizations such as the Council of Europe have urged the states to take measures to “withstand 
populist assaults” (Jagland, 2017, p. 5). A straighter forward stand has been taken by influential 
figures like the head of the Catholic Church, Pope Francis, who in 2018 claimed that “It is 
important that young people should know how populism is born. I think of Hitler last century, who 
had promised the development of Germany. That we know how populism starts: by sowing hate. 
You can't live sowing hate” (Staudenmaier, 2018). 
In the Swiss context, we can observe the populism/anti-populism divide within the electoral 
campaign processes. In the same arena, we find Tamara Funiciello, a Member of the National 
Council with the Social Democratic Party (SP), openly self-identified as a left-populist. The Swiss 
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People's Party (SVP), a well-known right-wing populist political project, and the 
newcomer Operation Libero consolidated as an organization to "fight right-wing populism."  
Funiciello has argued the need for reclaiming the term as a communication strategy to 
shape the discourse around socialist initiatives like tax reform that proportionally targets the 
wealthiest citizens. "We just try to explain things in an easy way. When you don't simplify, as a 
party, you have no chance." (O’Sullivan, 2019). In parallel, the SVP, with a long tradition of 
electoral success and mass mobilization, is widely considered a populist party in terms of its 
charismatic leadership and radicalized rhetoric against immigration and EU integration.  
While on the other side of the frontier, Operation Libero explains that to beat populism, 
"we have to go on the offensive"… "…we set the terms of the debate by portraying the SVP's 
proposal as an attack against fundamental Swiss values. Against the constitution as a pillar of our 
liberal democracy; the rule of law; equal justice for all. We were the patriots here, because this 
was an attack on things that every Swiss citizen holds dear" (Henley, 2019). 
When it comes to the literature review, it is well known that a myriad of publications is 
concentrated on the supply-side of populism. These studies focus on interest actors, populist 
politicians, and political parties by analyzing their manifestos, speeches, or other forms of 
communication (e.g., Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Hawkins, 2009; Blassnig et al., 2019; Rooduijn & 
Pauwels, 2011; Engesser et al., 2017). More recently, the research branch expanded to the demand-
side of populism and the public opinion field by analyzing individual populist attitudes from 
diverse angles (e.g., Hawkins et al., 2012; Akkerman et al., 2014; Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016; 
Staerklé & Green, 2018; Schulz, Müller, et al., 2018). 
Nevertheless, anti-populism remains understudied as the research object. The few known 
accounts that have broken into the populism/anti-populism frontier are also principally focused on 
the supply-side perspective and applied to a singular national case study (i.e., Greece). In these 
empirical studies, anti-populist discourses of media outlets and political party leaders are evaluated 
in contrast with the contextual populist expressions (e.g., Nikisianis et al., 2019; Stavrakakis et al., 
2016; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2019). Other studies have mainly developed the theoretical 
framework that proposes the mutual constitution of populism and anti-populism from a discursive-
performative perspective (e.g., Ostiguy, 2009; De Cleen et al., 2018; De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 
2017; Moffitt, 2018). 
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Yet, studies that explore the discursive patterns of anti-populism empirically in public 
opinion, and more precisely, at the individual level (i.e., demand-side) are overlooked in the large 
body of literature on populism. 
This thesis is based on the critical analysis provided by relevant literature and a primary 
cross-sectional survey research and attempts to address anti-populism as the research object. In 
specific, we pursue the existence of anti-populism as the counterpart of populism by determining 
the presence of anti-populist attitudes at the individual level, as well as its plausible association 
with other attitudinal variables (i.e., its correlates).  
To respond to the research questions: How do individuals rate on anti-populism, and 
which socio-political variables associate with anti-populism? We implemented a quantitative 
research design that involved a cross-sectional survey using a convenience sampling strategy 
among students and graduate researchers from Swiss Universities, which was conducted by web-
based mode between April 14th and June 10th, 2020, on a total sample of 305 units, with a 
completion rate of 67%3. Moreover, factor analysis and hierarchical multiple linear regression 
were implemented for the analysis of the results. 
In the following chapters, we will first provide the theoretical framework utilized to 
formulate the exploratory hypotheses, followed by a description of the methodological framework 
applied for the research design and data collection, including information on measurements and 
the general description of the sample. The results chapter includes the main descriptions and 
discussions of the research findings. Finally, conclusions are linked to the hypotheses, pointing 
out some implications for the academic debate, as well as the strengths and limitations of the 
approach taken, in addition to some recommendations for future research on the topic. 
  
 








“… for every populist actor asserting its presence, 
there are other anti-populist actors antagonizing it…” 
(Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2019, p. 3). 
 
Anti-populism is intrinsically associated with the concept of populism. The prefix “anti” 
immediately brings us to the notion of opposition (i.e., to be against populism). But beyond this 
intuitive interpretation, drawing from the discursive-performative approach, we can understand 
their mutual constitution, characteristics, triggers, and ultimately their empirical representations at 
the individual level. 
Populism/Anti-Populism Mutual Constitution  
The discursive-performative approach recognizes populism and anti-populism categories, and 
their empirical manifestations as specific types of discourse actively expressed in language and/or 
performance “…that has significant effects on how politics (and political identity) is structured 
and operates…” (Moffitt, 2020, p. 38). 
Minimally defined, populism is the contemplation of society as a juxtaposed dynamic 
between “the people” and “the elite” (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 6).  
In its simplified view, “the people” is a vague construction of society, attained to 
interpretations and the implications of current contextual realities, but mainly portrayed as a 
marginalized group. Meanwhile, “the elite” or “the establishment” captures those “powerful 
others” seen as undermining the fulfillment of the general will of the people. The “general will” 
suggests popular sovereignty and a critique of representative democracy (Panizza 2005, 6; 
Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2019, 2; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, 12-16).  
On the other hand, anti-populism is an antagonistic political logic that concretely opposes 
what is intentionally signified as “populism” in defense of existing norms, regimes, and latent 
power relations discursively associated with a notion of liberal representative democracy that 
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could be embodied in national4 or supra-national frames (De Cleen et al., 2018; Moffitt, 2018; 
Ostiguy, 2009; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2019).  
Following the discursive-performative approach, we argue that in both scenarios, the 
antagonistic articulation is employed by different actors with the purpose of constructing collective 
identities (Mouffe 2009: 16) in the hopes of “…navigating the fields of power that comprise the 
political…” (Moffitt 2016: 38). 
Furthermore, the identities are built based on homogeneity, not necessarily  associated with 
exclusionary demands but rather as a byproduct of the capacity of aggregation of diverse interests 
and demands (also grievances) to conform a simple and easy to grasp political project and common 
cause that attempts to challenge or defend established structures or to influence decision-making 
processes (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017; Laclau, 2005).  
The articulation is done through empty signifiers like “the people” and how they combine, 
relate, and position with other signifiers and discursive elements that determine the populist or 
anti-populist representation and narrative (i.e., their particular meaning). 
Hence, in the case of populism, the principal empty signifiers are “the people” and “the 
elite” organized against each other in a down/up vertical differentiation that can vary on a 
nationalist in/out horizontal exclusionary axis, as well as in a left/right ideological orientation, 
whereas for anti-populism the main empty signifier is “populism” organized against “democracy” 
on a low/high vertical dimension, that also can vary in the in/out and left/right horizontal axes (De 
Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017; Ostiguy, 2009). However, neither populism nor anti-populism as 
political logics has an exclusive associated ideological or normative stance. This valuation, when 
present, will depend on the particular political project that is being fostered. 
Each discourse is developed by invoking their particular signifiers and interpreting the  
"different meanings and normative inflections depending on the context within which it appears…" 
most commonly constructing a shared discontent and dissatisfaction towards the endanger of the 
common interests, demands, and identities (De Cleen et al., 2018, p. 3) which in turn sets the stage 
for the mutual foundation and polarization between populism and anti-populism, that is vital to 
examine as a form of contextualizing the broader hegemonic structure (Stavrakakis, 2017). 
 
4 Not necessarily with a nationalist connotation, but as a point of reference to historical, institutional, or 
systemic formal limitations of an imagined political community identified with a territory (Jessop, 2010). 
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Populism/Anti-Populism Performativity & Content Characterization 
For further characterization of populism and anti-populism, we include the work of Pierre Ostiguy 
(2009, 2017). He complements the vertical differentiation down/up with a low/high appeal 
approach that is indicative of the stylistic and historically connected forms in which the processes 
of representation and identity formation operate in and for populism and anti-populism.  
Focused on the sociocultural and sociopolitical dimensions in which relational practices 
and decision-making processes take place, populism is known for mobilizing the “flaunting of the 
low” while anti-populism defends or pre-empts contention towards the generally “high.” For the 
sociocultural, populism is associated with the articulation of political interaction between leaders, 
the social base, and the elite established through “low manners,” whilst anti-populism articulation 
is linked to “high manners” (Moffitt, 2018; Ostiguy, 2017).  
Low manners and high manners make emphasis on opposite traits or practices that can be 
build-up as identities and forms of asserting and appealing leadership. Hence, the low performs, 
for instance, closeness, transgressiveness, conflict, and provocation, to defend an allegedly 
unrepresented truth or sector (e.g., the silent majority, the marginalized), while anti-populism 
performs distance, for instance, with formality, and a polished and composed behavior (Ostiguy, 
2017, p. 90). These comprise cultural assets of distinction and markers of social mobility, and more 
precisely, expressions and traits of social identities politized to interact with political identities 
(Bourdieu, 2000).  
On the sociopolitical or political-cultural dimension, we locate the low and the high 
opposition in relation to the ways in which political leadership is presented and the forms in which 
decision-making processes are developed; on this dimension, populism appeals and advocates for 
the personalism of politics embodied in charismatic leaders, and with the incorporation of more 
instances of direct participation from the population, as opposed to the anti-populism preference 
for impersonal proceduralism, institutionalism, and formalism associated with bureaucratic 
systems and the technocracy of politics. 
Moreover, is important to notice that the articulation is not merely a top-down 
(manipulative or imposed) relationship between political actors and individuals, but rather a two-
way relational articulation that is founded on those “high” or “low” appeals that resonate within 
particular sections of the society due to sociocultural, economic, and political historical reasons 
(Ostiguy, 2017, pp. 87–89). 
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Therefore, coming from what each of the discourses advocates and appeal for, the actions 
of distinction and contention in the political space are translated as the disregard of the common 
traits of its opposite camp by interpreting them from a negative standpoint and using them as 
delegitimizing arguments against “their way” of doing politics versus a “right way,” a Manichean 
view of society that makes distinctions between a homogeneous “good” and a homogeneous “evil” 
(Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 6–10). Also, by misleadingly assigning labels like “the 
elite” and “populist” to specific convenient examples, which primary feature is not necessarily 
being part of an elite or the populist discourse.  
Furthermore, without explicitly referencing anti-populism, the work of Mudde and Rovira-
Kaltwasser (2017, pp. 6–10) associates pluralism and elitism as two apparent opposites of 
populism. According to the authors, elitism follows the same societal distinction and antagonistic 
differentiation of groups, as is done by populism. By means of a Manichean distinction, elitists 
target “the people” as “…dangerous, dishonest, and vulgar…” while they, “the elite,” are morally, 
culturally, and intellectually superior to its counterpart. Following this belief, elitism advocates for 
“…politics to be exclusively or predominantly an elite affair, in which the people do not have a 
say…” (2017, p. 7) 
Moreover, a minimal concept of pluralism sees it as the “…compromise of different 
viewpoints, and the need to listen to dissenting voices…”  as opposed to a vision grounded on the 
division of camps (Akkerman et al., 2014, p. 8). Pluralists advocate a distribution of power that 
reflects the diversity of groups and interests in society without imposing one group over others 
(2017, p. 7).  
Democracy, Crisis & Media 
Another source of specificity for populism and anti-populism comes from their particular 
association with democracy, as mentioned in the previous section. Both camps set themselves as 
advocates and defenders of democracy, placing the other as the threat and pathology of their desire 
model of political participation and representation.  
For populism, one of the key arguments is set on the idea of restitution of the popular 
sovereignty, implying an imbalance between the liberal pillar and the democratic pillar in the 
current state of democracy. According to this interpretation, the primacy of individual rights and 
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the rule of law constrains the involvement of “the people” and consolidates an elite's hegemony.  
For anti-populism, the systems built around liberal democracy are highly valued, and the 
expressions of populism within this model are seen as an external problem to be solved and avoided 
at all cause (Moffitt, 2018, p. 9). 
At this point, the division between both perspectives and representations can be reinforced 
when it turns to normative and even moral qualifications with the intention of cultivating fear and 
hatred to their counterpart, a group-level strategy of differentiation based on “…a demonization of 
their enemy…”. (Stavrakakis et al., 2017, p. 17). For populists, the abstract “elite” condenses all 
the problems in society, the same for anti-populists, where "populism" is dismantling politics and 
democracy's stability. 
Yet, the difference between populism and anti-populism lies in how, for the latter, the 
demonization could be extended to “the people” that follow a populist leader, movement, or party. 
In specific, anti-populism sees the populist identifier motivations as homogeneously wrong, at the 
risk of marginalizing their grievances. Anti-populism tends to dismiss or question electoral 
deliberations from the basis that it is irrational and a result of manipulation, signaling an extreme 
self-righteousness stance that enhances antagonism (Moffitt, 2018; Stavrakakis et al., 2017).  
An example framed at this level comes from the remarks made by Hillary Clinton in the 
middle of the 2016 electoral race at a fundraising event in New York: “You know, to just be grossly 
generalistic, you could put half of Trump’s supporters into what I call the basket of deplorables. 
Right? The racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic—you name it. And 
unfortunately, there are people like that. And he has lifted them up” (Reilly, 2016).  
In the example, “the people” signifier is presented as the opponent and interpreted as a 
plausible cause of instability and ultimate damage to democracy. An argument that leads to another 
source of articulation that plays an important role in the development of the frontier between 
populism and anti-populism, which is the role of the crisis, but most importantly, who is to blame 
for the crisis.  
In this context, a crisis can be defined as the perception and communication of an anomaly 
or failure that was not effectively incorporated by the established system of representation, that is 
later on judged with populist or anti-populist discourse, both relying on blame attribution and 
differentiation of identities (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2019). Hence, we find objective and 
performative construction of crisis around diverse issues like the state of the economy, democratic 
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representation, environment, and more. The crisis becomes a signifier, object of subjective 
appreciations made by different actors with specific interests in mind.  
Within the populism/anti-populism divide, the examples include the financial-economic 
crisis of 2017-2008 and its aftermath, the so-called crisis of democratic representation and politics 
related to coup attempts (e.g., Turkey, Honduras, Venezuela, Brazil), the Brexit Referendum, the 
climate change crisis, and more recently, the worldwide sanitary crisis of Coronavirus (Covid-19).  
Drawing from Moffit (2016, p. 119), the “spectacularization of failure” sets the stage for 
polarization, blame attribution, and demand for particular political or policy changes and 
implementations.  
The failures become mediated and elevated to a crisis level amid a divide seeking process, 
characterized by linking the failure to a broader framework of problems, presenting easy solutions 
and easy targets to blame as responsible for the crisis, and the legitimization of their actors camp 
(Moffitt, 2016).  
In this process, media’s use for the distribution of the constructed rhetoric plays a vital 
function. The intended messages of crisis, the victims, and the perpetrators are disseminated and 
enhanced by the distinct media sources that have a political role. 
From public communication theory, we know that interest groups are very much able “…to 
steer news and public attention to key political issues while simultaneously defining them in 
advantageous ways.” Consequently, public opinion can be indirectly influenced by concrete ways 
of strategically selecting and designing the communication of a message around an issue of 
political interest (Nisbet & Feldman, 2011, p. 285). 
Notably, the information that is conveyed by the mass media, which has a broader 
commonly engaged audience, has a great deal of influence due to the connection that establishes 
between “the world outside” and the “pictures on our heads.” In other words, mass media helps in 
the organization of everyday reality and the establishment of linkages with people’s beliefs and 
values (Lippmann, 1922). 
Theory on communication has developed three main concepts that describe the specific 
ways in which the media can shape or influence public opinion concerning a particular perspective. 
First, agenda-setting describes the process in which the news media decides on the issues of 
importance in a determinate context. It is the creation of awareness of issues determined as salient 
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and the process of subjectively filtering reality by concentrating on certain topics rather than others 
(Nisbet & Feldman, 2011, p. 286). 
Through the agenda-setting, the media tells people about what topics they should learn, but 
also by priming, which is the act of giving more substantial coverage to specific issues, the media 
tells people how much importance they should attach to a concrete issue (Nisbet & Feldman, 2011, 
p. 287). 
Additionally, people develop, reinforce, or reorient a particular conceptualization of a 
subject through the framing effects in communication. Framing is the ability to tell people how to 
think about an issue by using specific characteristics of the message that wants to be 
communicated. That characterization directly or indirectly signals who might be responsible and 
what can or should be the solution; in other words, it impacts people’s perceptions and 
interpretations about the subject (Chong & Druckman, 2007b). 
In this instance, metaphors are commonly utilized to circulate the desired discourse and in 
favor of the construction of the oppositional social and political identities between populism and 
anti-populism. The study of  Nikisianis et al. (2019) on Greek press recognized clearly defined 
pro-populist and anti-populist messages provided through media, with a predominance of the latter 
in national news outlets. Here the tendency is to describe populism as a negative phenomenon, in 
association with polarizing adjectives such as “pathology,” “sickness,” “destructiveness,” and its 
threatening role towards the European Union, the economy, and democracy.  
According to Chong and Druckman (2007a, p. 104), the frame's potential influence can be 
measured in terms of loudness and strength. Whichever frame is loudest, that is, the frame repeated 
most frequently will have the most significant influence on individuals’ opinions, having 
everything else constant. Alternatively, the strength will exert the greatest influence regardless of 
repetition, and it is determined “…when comes from a credible source..., resonates with consensus 
values…, and does not contradict strongly held prior beliefs…". 
Exploratory Hypotheses 
As was noted in the introduction, the general aim of this particular research was to explore the 
populism/anti-populism divide by analyzing the demand-side of anti-populism. For this purpose, 
we were interested in measuring anti-populist attitudes at the individual level and studying the 
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extent to which socio-political variables have an effect on it. Figure 2 presents the model of anti-
populism analysis that was followed by this project. 
First, following the theoretical framework, we decided to measure anti-populist attitudes 
following a semantic differential technique, which consists of a list of attitude scales that specifies 
bipolar responses (Osgood et al., 1957). This method, which has been used marginally for 
populism research5, allows for the prescription of judgment on a continuum that gives a notion of 
variations in the meaning assigned to a particular object of evaluation. This particular design was 
considered the most appropriate for our conceptualization, resembling the opposing high and low 
axes with the dichotomous connotations that take part in the populism/anti-populism divide.  
In specific, we focused on sub-dimensions of behavioral competencies that relate to the 
technocracy of politics preference (e.g., disqualification; unrespectability); aspects of the morality 
of conduct (e.g., dishonesty; emotional); risk assessment (e.g., danger; threat; bad), and 
accusations focused on intolerance and cynicism. All of which fulfills the active role of 
“…displacement of politics by morality …” and the political logic that offers stability and rational 
meritocracy as an alternative to the disruption of populism (Mouffe, 2009; Stavrakakis & 
Katsambekis, 2019, pp. 6–11). 
On the other hand, we measured populist attitudes in three distinct dimensions, anti-elitism, 
demand for popular sovereignty, and a belief in the people’s homogeneity and virtuousness, which 
provides a flexible and nuanced alternative to address the populist frontier from a demand-side 
perspective. The multidimensional measurement aligns with the principal characteristics described 
from the discursive-performative perspective, that is, a Manichean worldview between “the 
people” and “the elite,” the chain of equivalences in the form of homogeneity, and the demand for 
popular sovereignty and people centrism (Schulz, Müller, et al., 2018). 
Concerning the correlates of anti-populism, we decided to initially test the effect of three 
socio-demographic variables: gender, age, and nationality. However, due to the absence of 
conclusions regarding the association of socio-demographic characteristics with anti-populism, we 
decided to leave the expectation open in terms of its positive or negative effect on anti-populism; 
this decision supported the exploratory nature of the study and characteristics of the sample, 
composed for the most part of a younger population (Hypothesis 1). 
 




Subsequently, we gauge on the commonly accepted argumentation about pluralism and 
elitism as opposite variables of populism (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017) (Hypotheses 2a, 
2b); we test this correlation in addition to the three dimensions of populist attitudes. As a result, 
we expect the populist attitudes dimensions to be inversely correlated to anti-populism, while 
pluralism and elitism to be positively correlated with anti-populist attitudes (Hypotheses 2c, 2d, 
2e). 
To incorporate the predominant role of political communication and media in the 
populism/anti-populism divide, we included predictor variables that attested to the level of trust in 
particular media information sources. In specific, we expect National News Media Trust to have a 
positive effect on anti-populist attitudes, while social media trust to be inversely correlated. This 
assumption comes from the social identity perspective that, in line with political communication 
theory, explains that populists identifiers prefer alternative media (Schulz, 2019), while anti-
populist identifiers will find confirmation of their worldview in national news media (Hypotheses 
3a and 3b). 
In relation to the idea of mediation of crisis within the populist/anti-populist divide, we 
analyzed satisfaction with the institutional response to the Coronavirus (Covid-19) outbreak and 
the identification of plausible causes related to its spread.  
In particular, we oriented the causes to the action level of “the people” in contrast to the 
actions of institutionalized actors. Here, we expect that the higher the levels of satisfaction with 
Covid-19 response, the more anti-populist attitudes. On the other hand, we expect that “blame” on 
the people for the spread of Covid-19 to be positively correlated with anti-populism, while “blame” 
on institutions to be inversely correlated with anti-populism (Hypotheses 4a, 4b, and 4c).  
These expectations are based on the assumption that anti-populist will prefer to legitimize 
the status-quo in rejection of extreme measures or disruptive alternatives while blaming certain 
groups of the population that are considered less knowledgeable prone to manipulation or 
misinformation, or less compliant with the social norms. 
It is worth keeping in mind that the impressions about Covid-19 might be influenced by 
the specific time in which the survey was distributed. Our survey was launched on April 14th, 2020, 
when the total of accumulated confirmed cases and deaths in Switzerland was 26,825 and 1,161, 
respectively. Switzerland became one of the first countries in Europe, after Italy and Spain, to 
experience an initial rapid increase in cases. At the date of the survey launch, the Swiss government 
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was already onset to “flattening” the curve and had already put in place measures such as 
widespread lockdowns in public institutions, the suggestion of remote work in private companies, 
reduced public transport services as well as recommendations for social distancing and personal 
hygiene protocols. At the time of closing the survey, confirmed cases and deaths had reached 
30,992 and 1,685 respectively, already reaching a clear “flattening” of the curve. At either stage 
of the evolution of cases, individuals can have varying opinions as to whether government 
measures or individual behaviors are to be blamed/praised for the status of the pandemic (FOPH, 
2020). 
Concerning democracy, we relied on the concept of democratic deficit, which refers to a 
perceived deficiency or incongruence between the democratic performance and democratic 
preferred aspirations. It presents a general evaluation of how democracy works in a particular 
context by measuring the level of approval of democratic values and principles, put in contrast 
with the evaluation of democratic performance. We expect democratic deficit scores to be 
negatively associated with anti-populism, implying a procedural perspective of democratic 
legitimacy, where decisions are conceived as legitimate if they follow the democratic standards, 
which can be related to participation, accountability, among others (Hypothesis 5a).  In addition, 
as another proxy of legitimacy with the current state of affairs, we presume that the predictor on 
political support that evaluates satisfaction with political outputs and institutional trust to be 
positively associated with anti-populism (Hypothesis 5b).  
Finally, to find the effect of organizing principles or general beliefs, which are building 
blocks of opinion and attitude formation, we studied the association of the entitlement principle 
and the propensity towards egalitarianism. For entitlement, defined as “…a general belief that one 
deserves more or is entitled to more than others…” (Campbell & Buffardi, 2007, p. 717), was used 
to assess the high/low differentiation, we expected to have a positive correlation with the 
dependent variable. For egalitarianism, briefly defined as the idea that all people should be treated 
as equals, and everyone should receive the same in a society (Bobbio, 1996, p. 60), will be left 
open in terms of the expectation of positive or negative effect on anti-populism, because we 
assumed different results depending on the ideological orientation of the populist example 
evaluated (Hypotheses 6a and 6b).  
 
 





































This chapter covers the methodological framework for the execution of the research project. It 
includes sections on research design, research object operationalization, survey design, and 
fieldwork. 
Research Design 
This project was developed from a quantitative research approach, with the implementation of a 
non-experimental descriptive-correlational research design and a cross-sectional survey as the 
gathering data instrument. 
 The selection of a survey design as the preferred instrument was based on previous works 
on the topic of populism, the lack of empirical data at the individual level to analyze anti-populism, 
as well as the conveniences that a survey design provided in terms of the costs, the required 
expertise, the access to logistical resources, and the rapid process of data gathering. 
 The survey landed with a non-experimental design due to the correlational interest of the 
theoretical proposal. In alignment with the scope, the instrument was applied at a single point in 
time. The mode designated was a web-based self-administered questionnaire (SAQ). This 
particular choice took into consideration aspects that represent an explicit effort for balancing 
mode appropriateness for our research question, and the different levels of impact in costs and 
survey errors.   
Spatial and Temporal Delimitation 
The spatial delimitation of this research project was defined in terms of a nation-state perspective 
(i.e., Switzerland). The temporal delimitation corresponded with the period of data collection 
between April 14th and June 10th, 2020. All of which was chosen as a matter of convenient access 
considering resources and time constraints. 
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Target population & Sample 
The target population consisted of individuals 18 years of age6 and older (with no upper age limit) 
residents, regardless of nationality or citizenship, that are current students or graduate researchers 
(PhD students and Post-Doctoral researchers) at Swiss public universities and institutes of 
technology (UIT)7.  
 According to a report from the Federal Statistical Office (FSO), in 2017/18, the population 
universe of UIT students and graduate researchers consisted of 152.858 individuals, 51% female 
students, and 30.6% international students. Additionally, we know that the most substantial 
proportion of students (i.e., ~ 60%) are at bachelor level programs, while 23% are at the master 
level, and 15% at the postgraduate level. Concerning the study fields, most of the students are 
enrolled in social and economic sciences disciplines (16% and 14% respectively).  
 With a population universe of 152.858 individuals, a margin of error of 6%, and a 
confidence interval of 95%, the recommended and the chosen sample size was 266 units 
(individuals)8. With this in consideration and estimating a target response rate of 50%, we had to 
reach at least 532 individuals to achieve the sample size.  
Sampling Design 
For the selection of the observation and analysis units to complete the expected sample of 266 
individuals, we relied on a non-representative convenience sampling design. This particular form 
of sampling involves choosing readily available participants, with no strict selection rules or 
techniques (Salkind, 2010; Tansey, 2007, p. 769).  
 In the study, convenience was valued in terms of the availability of information for online 
contact and the accessibility to particular social media platforms.  
 
6 This criterion aligns with the average age of University entrance and the exclusion of minors, which required 
particular ethical guidelines. 
7 Ecole Polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich (ETHZ), 
Universität Basel, Universität Bern, Université de Fribourg, Université de Genève, Université de Lausanne, 
Universität Luzern, Université de Neuchâtel, Universität St. Gallen, Università della Svizzera italiana, and Universität 
Zürich. 




 In specific, we directly approached potential participants from whom we obtained contact 
information in official UIT's websites, and distributed invitations for participation in social media 
spaces known for gathering our target population. Therefore, the sample was simultaneously 
selected by the units that chose to participate in the study after being conveniently approached 
between April 14th and June 10th, 2020. 
 This particular sampling design implicated little control over the characteristics of the 
selected units, which lead to essential issues of external validity, such as sampling error, where the 
sample characteristics could systematically differ from the population; and under-coverage, where 
the entire exclusion of specific individual profiles in the sample can be inflicted (Larsen, 2007; 
Salkind, 2010). 
 Nevertheless, to mitigate the impact of these possible shortcomings, we made an effort to 
include some forms of control to direct the participation of the intended target population. For 
instance, the information displayed in the participation calls specifically asked for individuals that 
complied with the main filtering characteristics of our target population. 
 Additionally, to ensure that we were reaching out to our population of interest, we obtained 
the necessary information to directly contact individuals from UIT's official websites (e.g., 
directory, team's information from departments, research groups, etc.), which meant that we 
purposefully filter units that meet the required population characteristics. We also distributed the 
information through UIT's official student associations, social media groups and pages, courses 
distribution email lists, and learning platforms, as well as other social media channels oriented to 
students from Swiss UIT's.  
 Moreover, we described in other sections the relevant characteristics of the sample, which 
makes possible its comparison with the population of interest so that in further research, it can be 
subject to evaluation in terms of its representativeness (Waterfield, 2018). 
Survey Questionnaire Design 
Due to the novelty of the anti-populist variable, we were unable to locate a suitable instrument that 
we could reproduce for our purposes. For that reason, we recurred to the modification and creation 
of a new instrument appropriate for the target population and the general setting of the study. 
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 According to the population of interest, we design a web-based self-administered survey 
questionnaire that attained a high level of general literacy, a moderate level of socio and political 
knowledge, internet literacy, internet access, and a reasonable level of understanding of English or 
French language. 
 Because the study was interested in capturing attitudes related to political perspectives, 
most of the expected responses were non-factual and subjective interpretations of the perceived 
circumstances, as well as manifestations of motivating beliefs. The nature of the response was 
captured mainly through pre-established close-ended ordinal response categories that 
consequently provided ordinal indicators and variables. However, the instrument also included 
nominal and metric variables (see Appendix A for Survey Questionnaires and D for Alignment 
Matrix).  
 The survey was divided into three main sections: the welcome page, the core module of 
questions, and the closing page. The welcome page described the general information about the 
survey, a brief description the instrument’s purpose, and survey instructions. Additionally, it 
included the notification about the voluntary, anonymous, and confidential character of 
participation, researcher’s contact information, the privacy policy information, and consent option 
(see Appendix C for the Ethical Considerations and Survey Data Privacy Statement). 
 The questionnaire’s second and core module was organized and divided into groups that 
relate items measuring similar variables. Nevertheless, the design favored flexibility in the 
arrangement of the sections in order to improve the sequence and the experience for the respondent. 
This section contained a total of 80 questions items, varying between dichotomous, 5-point Likert 
scale, 11-point (0-10) ordinal scales, 5-point semantic-differential, and open-ended questions. 
 The closing section reiterated the appreciation for the completion of the survey, provided 
contact information, and the invitation link to participate in a lottery for a chance to win a 20 CHF 
gift-card incentive (mentioned to the potential participants at the distribution stage), and a space 
for comments or information requests (see Appendix A for the Surveys in English and French). 
Survey Validity & Reliability  
The validity, which refers to the level of accuracy and consequent trustworthiness of the survey; 
and reliability, which is the degree to which the survey instrument consistently measures the same 
problem and their different variables at different moments, obtaining the same measurements 
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repeatedly indistinctly of the moment in which is applied, were considered in the process of survey 
questionnaire design. 
 Particularly, we relied on a continuous iterative quality evaluation process, which oriented 
aspects in the wording, the order, and the overall item formulation. Simultaneously, we prioritized 
using items that have already been tested and widely used in the field. Mainly, we implemented 
questions that appear in articles about populism published in journals of high impact factor. For 
other variables of common interest, we use the methodological information provided by the 
European Social Survey. Specifically, we consulted the translations and the modules that have been 
recently reviewed and applied in the Swiss context.  
 Additionally, we conducted survey evaluations that included methods of informal testing, 
expert review, Question Appraisal System (QAS-99), and a cognitive interview, from which we 
revise questions comprehension by checking the consistency of words, format simplicity, time 
reference for particular questions, and elimination of double-barreled questions that measured 
multiple constructs in the same item, among other aspects that improved the information retrieval 
process. 
Survey Data Collection Fieldwork 
The process of data collection started on April 14th and concluded on June 10th, 2020. The 
fieldwork consisted of an intense process of distribution and calls for participation in social media 
platforms, particularly Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and LinkedIn. We made publications in 
different social media groups and pages associated with the population of interest and Swiss UIT’s.  
 For this process, we utilized a personal social media account9 to ask for access to different 
private and public groups, and the publications relied on the use of flyers in English and French 
that provided necessary information of the survey and the option to participate in a lottery for a 20 
CHF gift-card.  
 In parallel, we established direct contact with students and graduate researchers using 
institutional emails publicly displayed on official websites from the UIT institutions. We contacted 
 




student associations and organizations, as well as professors, to ask for collaboration with the 
survey distribution.  
 In total, we send out ~347 individual and personalized emails to contact participants (see 
Appendix B for examples on Survey Distribution). These contacts were made with a personal 
institutional email from the University of Lausanne. On May 13th, Professor Staerklé (UNIL) 
distributed the survey among 543 students from his course and published the survey information 
in the course Moodle platform. Professor Hulliger (UNINE) also published the flyer in his course 
Moodle platform. Additionally, several PhD students and post-doctoral researchers helped send 
out emails to the graduate and postgraduate students of their corresponding research groups (e.g., 
Adolphe Merkle Institute in Fribourg, University of Geneva, ETH Zurich, University of Bern). 
Completion Rate 
 Since we are dealing with a non-probability sampling method (i.e., convenience sampling), 
the computation of response rates is not applicable. Nevertheless, to have a sense of the data 
collection process and survey distribution, we can calculate a completion rate, which is defined as 
the ratio of the number of surveys returned to the number of requested surveys.  
 Therefore, with a total of 305 completed surveys, collected by June 10th, 2020, the 
completion rate calculated from the total sum of surveys, including the incomplete responses (i.e., 
455) is 67%. In terms of response rate, this percentage surpasses the minimum baseline of ~50% 
considered adequate for social science research (Groves et al., 2009); however for convenience 
sampling, a high completion rate conveys anything particularly meaningful or relevant about the 
respondents. 
 Another plausible completion reference value is calculated from the sum of emails contacts 
made to reach out participants (i.e., ~890) that provide a rate of 34.3%. This much lower 
completion rate can be associated with the absence of implementation of follow-ups and 
reminders. At the same time, we note that this can be regarded as a higher limited value as it is 
difficult to estimate the actual number of individuals reached via the distribution lists accessed by 




Data Management & Preparation 
The survey’s data management and preparation comprised iterative stages of processed responses 
exploration; codification, and labeling of variables and response categories, variable 
transformations, among others.  
 Two aspects to emphasize: the elimination of the IP addresses column information from 
the dataset, to reinforce the anonymized treatment of the participants' responses, and the removal 
of any form for possible tracing; and the recodification of open question associated with the “work 
or study field” variable, in specific, we created a new variable based on the original, and manually 
cleaned and classified each of the responses, according to the International Standard Classification 
of Education (ISCED F-2013)10. 
 Additionally, the handling of system missing values, which refer to values that are entirely 
absent from the data, required a thorough general inspection per variable and per case, with the 
use of descriptive statistics.  
 First, among the numerical variables, we identified four variables (i.e., Political Interest, 
Political Participation in Political Party, Political Participation in Protest, and Vote in the Last 
National Elections) with two missing values (i.e., 305 - N = number of missing values, 305-303 = 
2), and 56 variables with one missing value (i.e., 305-304 = 1). Following this inspection per 
variable, we confirmed the absence of high levels of missingness; therefore, none of the variables 
were excluded for analysis. 
On the other hand, from the inspection of system missing values per case, we found one 
case containing 4 system missing values and another one containing 59. With this information, we 
decided to filter from further analysis only the case with 59 system missing values, which was 
considered a significant level of missingness on the study’s variables of interest. 
Another source of missing values corresponds to deliberate exclusions of specific 
responses (e.g., “Don't Know”) for a particular analysis. After exploring the data and considering 
the complexity and number of variables included in the study, we decided to declare as user 
missing values the “Other” category in the Gender variable, and the “Don't Know” category in the 
Household Financial Situation variable. 
 
10The ISCED is the reference international classification for organizing education programs and related 






Anti-populist attitudes were measured using 18 items following Osgood et al.’s (1957) 
semantic differential technique, which consists of a list of attitude scales that specifies bipolar 
opposing response categories in the format of a 1 to 5-point rating scale ranging from “Very”, 
“Somewhat,” “Neither/Nor,” “Somewhat,” “Very.” In particular, we asked respondents about 
which adjective came closer to their impression about right- and left-wing populist parties or 
movements, providing specific examples for each of the ideological spectrums (e.g., SVP in 
Switzerland as a Right-Wing example, and La France Insoumise in France as a Left-Wing 
example). In addition, we asked for which populism and democracy statements came closer to 
their view, utilizing the same 1 to 5-point rating scale.  
To check for the dimensionality of the items, we perform Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), 
which resulted in the computation of two composite scores; this process is described in detail in 
the Results chapter.  
Predictive variables 
With respect to the exploratory analysis of correlates, we took into account predictor variables 
related to our theoretical framework and hypotheses, along with socio-demographic variables. 
Among the socio-demographic variables, we entered age (as a continuous variable), gender 
(dichotomous) with male as the reference category, and nationality (dichotomous) with non-Swiss 
(or foreign) as the reference category.  
The variable nationality was constructed by recoding survey responses on the question about 
the vote in the Swiss parliamentary elections for the National Council on October 20th, 2019, in 
which the information of “Not eligible” to vote function as a proxy for Swiss and non-Swiss 
nationality. 
Respondents populist attitudes were measured using a combination of modified items from 
Akkerman et al. (2014) and Schulz et al. (2018) that included nine question statements in a 1 to 5-
point Likert scale, from “Disagree strongly” (1): to “Agree strongly” (5), and where agreement 
with each of the statements pointed-out to respondents’ populist attitudes.  
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Following our interest in a multidimensional measurement, we included three items for each 
of the three main dimensions of populism, that is Homogeneity and Virtuousness dimension (e.g., 
“In general, ordinary people are of good and honest character”); Anti-Elitism (e.g., “Politicians 
very quickly lose touch with ordinary people”), and Demand for Popular Sovereignty (e.g., “The 
people should be asked whenever important decisions are taken”). 
To check for the dimensionality of the items, we performed a Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) on the battery of nine items constructed for populist attitudes measurement11.  
Initially, we confirmed sampling adequacy, with a Kaiser-Mayer-Olin measure value above 
of the commonly recommended (KMO = .64) and a significant Bartlett’s test of sphericity (χ2(36) 
= 494.074, p < .001).   
The results from the initial analysis revealed three eigenvalues over the 1.0 threshold 
indicating the presence of three principal components. The three components together accounted 
for 60% of the variance (Component 1 = 26%; Component 2 = 17%; Component 3 = 17%, 
eigenvalues = 2.34, 1.58, 1.51 respectively).  
After the varimax rotation method of the component matrix, we noticed that two out of three 
items on Demand for Popular Sovereignty loaded with the first component. Similarly, two out of 
three items related to Anti-Elitism loaded with the second component, and all items about 
Homogeneity and Virtuousness loaded with the third component (see Table 1 below). None of the 
items were eliminated, as the contributions maintain values above .40, and no cross-loadings of 
.30 and above were present. 
With the exception of just one item in the first and second components, this solution is highly 
aligned with previous theoretical proposals on populist attitudes measurement (Schulz, Müller, et 
al., 2018). The first component refers to Demand for Popular Sovereignty, the second component 
refers to Anti-Elitism, and the third component refers to Homogeneity and Virtuousness, with three 
items each. 
Internal consistency for each component was examined using Cronbach’s alpha. Obtaining 
and acceptable value for the Component 1 (α = .76), and questionable values for Component 2 (α 
= .59), and Component 3 (α = .58). Just the last component showed a slight increment in alpha (α 
= .61) with the elimination of one item (i.e., hom1). 
 




Table 1. PCA for Items Measuring Populist Attitudes (N=304). 
   Components   
N° Item  1 2 3 M SD 
1 anti3 
The people, not the politicians, should 
make our most important policy 
decisions. 
.832 .157  2.98 1.06 
2 sov2 
The people should be asked whenever 
important decisions are taken 
.817  .163 2.53 .99 
3 sov1 
The people should have the final say on 
the most important political issues by 
voting on them directly in referendums. 
.784   3.08 .81 
4 anti1 
Politicians very quickly lose touch with 
ordinary people. 
.141 .764  3.32 .90 
5 anti2 
Politicians talk too much and take too 
little action. 
 .760  3.42 .93 
6 sov3 
People like me have no influence on 
what the government does. 
 .693  2.46 1.00 
7 hom2 
Most ordinary people share similar 
values and interests. 
  .855 3.82 0.95 
8 hom3 
Although the Swiss are very different 
from each other, when it comes down to 
truly important decisions about how 
society should work, they all tend to 
think the same. 
  .735 3.01 1.12 
9 hom1 
In general, ordinary people are of good 
and honest character. 
.259  .582 3.27 1.06 
 Explained variance 60% 26% 17% 17%   
 Eigenvalues 2.34 1.58 1.51   
 Cronbach’s Alpha .76 .59 .58   
Note. Factor analysis applying principle component analysis and varimax rotation converged in 4 iterations; factor 
loadings lower than .1 were suppressed; KMO = .64; N = 304. 
 
Composite scores were computed for each of the three components, based on the mean of 
the corresponding items. Higher scores indicated greater populist attitudes. Demand for Popular 
Sovereignty was the populist attitude dimension that respondents scored higher with a negatively 
skewed distribution. Anti-elitism scored slightly less but maintained the negatively skewed 
distribution, whilst Homogeneity and Virtuousness maintained lower scores and a positively 







Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the three Populist attitudes component indices (N=304) 









M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
C1 
Demand for Popular 
Sovereignty 
3 1-5 point .76  3.36 .85 -.13 -.34 
C2 Anti-Elitism 3 1-5 point .59  3.25 .73 -.05 -.26 
C3 Homogeneity & Virtuousness 2 1-5 point .61 .44 2.50 .85 .25 -.54 
Note: For Component 3 an item was eliminated that increased the Cronbach’s alpha.         
 
Pluralist and elitist attitudes were measured with two items each, with response categories 
that follow a 1-5 point Likert scale format from “Disagree Strongly” (1) to “Agree Strongly” (5) to 
the question “We would like to know to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements?” (e.g., “In a democracy, it is important to make compromises among different 
viewpoints,” for pluralism; and “In general, ordinary people can be trusted to understand our 
nation’s problems,” a reverse-scored item for elitism).  
For the creation of composite scores, we reviewed the correlation and obtained a positive 
and significant correlation for both variables, r = .34, and r = .20, respectively. However, due to 
the low correlation between the elitism items, we decided to keep it as a single item variable, 
including “Our Countries will be governed better if important decisions were only made by 
professionals and experts.” 
With regard to media trust, we measured National News Media Trust and Social Media 
Trust with a single item each on a 0 to 10-point ordinal scale, ranging from “Not trust at all” (0) 
to “Complete trust” (10). 
 For the variables that were intended to assess impressions around the Coronavirus (Covid-
19) outbreak, we included Satisfaction with Covid-19 Response measured with five items on a 0 -
10 scale from “Extremely dissatisfied” (0) to “Extremely satisfied” (10). The test for internal 
consistency with the five items provided a satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha of .80; however, with the 
exclusion of one item on educational institutions, the reliability increased to .83. Hence, we 
eliminated that item to create a composite score, computed with the mean of the individual scores 
on the rest of the items. PCA confirmed the presence of a single factor that explained 68% of the 
variance (KMO = .80, Bartlett’s sphericity test 𝜒2(10) = 555.280, p < .001). 
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 To examine people’s opinions regarding the perceived causes of the Coronavirus spread, 
we use three measurement items that targeted people’s behaviors as related factors that explained 
the spread (e.g., “Older people continued to go out even after the first restrictions”), and two items 
that targeted institutional actions as the related factors (e.g., “Too slow response from national 
governments and international organizations”). The associated question was, “How related or not 
do you  think each of the following situations has been in the spread of the coronavirus (COVID-
19)?”.  
For all of the items, we used a 1to 5-point ordinal scale from “Extremely related” (1) to 
“Not related at all” (5). Counterintuitively, an increment in the value signified a lower perceived 
relationship to the statement as a cause for the Covid-19 spread; therefore, we proceeded to recoded 
each of the items so that a high value indicated an increment in the scale.  
The internal consistency test confirmed an acceptable Cronbach’s alpha, value (α = .74), 
among the three items that measured People is to blame for Covid-19 spread. The PCA attested 
for a single factor that explains 66% of the variance (KMO = .68, Bartlett’s sphericity test 𝜒2(3) = 
208.448, p < .001), which supported the creation of a composite score with the mean values for 
each item. On the other hand, the two items measuring Institutions are to blame for Covid-19 
presented a moderately significant positive correlation of .51. Hence, we created a composite 
score, again, with the mean values for each item. 
To examine Democratic Deficit, we measured the difference between two single-item 
independent variables, Democratic Aspirations and Satisfaction with Democracy; both presented 
on a 0 to 10-point ordinal scale. That resulted in a new composite score that ranges from -10 to 10, 
were higher values indicated a higher perception of democratic deficit. 
To analyze the effect of Political Support, we included six ordinal indicators items related 
to general policy satisfaction (e.g., “How satisfied or dissatisfied are you nowadays with the way 
the Swiss government is doing its job?”) and institutional trust (e.g., “On a score between 0 and 
10, how much do you personally trust if at all Political parties in Switzerland?”). All items on a 0 
to10-point ordinal scale. For the construction of a composite score, we perform a PCA that 
indicated the presence of only one component, including the six items. In terms of reliability with 
the computation of the Cronbach’s alpha, we obtain a value α = .87 (α > .80 is good). The exclusion 
of items did not show any improvement in the Cronbach’s alpha; hence we kept all of the indicators 
for the variable. 
 
41 
For Entitlement, we included a single item (i.e., “A society is fair when people from families 
with high social status enjoy privileges in their lives”) measured on a 1 to 5-point Likert scale that 
ranged from “Disagree strongly” (1) to “Agree strongly” (5). 
Finally, to explore the association of we include Egalitarianism, which was measured in 
the survey with four items (e.g., “A society is fair when wealth is evenly redistributed among all 
of the people”) under the 1 to 5-point Likert scale format from “Disagree strongly” (1) to “Agree 
strongly” (5). After reverse-scoring an item (i.e., fair7), for the construction of a composite score, 
we attested a satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha reliability of .73, and the unidimensionality with PCA 
obtaining that a single factor explained 59% of the variance (KMO = .74, Bartlett’s sphericity test 
𝜒2(6) = 307.861, p < .001). 
Survey Respondents 
The survey sample’s socio-demographic characteristics described in Table 3 show that more than 
half of the respondents (67%) identify as females. This characteristic in the sample is congruent 
with the female distribution (51%) in the target population reported by the Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office in 2019 (FSO, 2019, pp. 21–22). 
Additionally, 41.8% of respondents reported “Living comfortably,” followed by a 35% that 
indicated, “Meet my basic expenses with a little left for extras.” These categories are part of the 
household financial situation variable that, in our study, offers a proxy of the economic status of 
the individual.  
Furthermore, 50.7% of respondents indicated they voted in the last Swiss parliamentary 
elections (October 20th, 2019), compared to 13.5% that did not. However, a significant percentage 
(35.5%) manifested not being eligible to vote. This could indicate that in our sample, a 
considerable number of participants might not be of Swiss nationals, a characteristic that is 
consistent with the target population, in which 30.6% are international students (FSO, 2019, pp. 
21–22). 
Finally, the average age in the sample is 26 years (SD = 6.58), and in general, they report 
a Left-Wing ideological orientation preference (M = 3.64, SD = ± 1.9 on a 0-10 scale). 
 
42 
Table 3. Sample Survey Respondents Description (N=304). 
  Variables N % M SD 
Gender     
 Female 205 67.4 
  
 Male 98 32.2 
  
Household Financial Situation     
 
Live comfortably 127 41.8   
 
Meet my basic expenses with a little left for extras 106 34.8   
 
Just meet my basic expense 56 18.4   
 
Don't even have enough to make basic expenses 11 3.6   
Vote*     
 
Yes 154 50.7   
 
No 41 13.5   
 
Not Eligible 108 35.5   
Age 304  26.21 6.58 
Left-Right Ideological Orientation 304  3.64 1.90 
* Vote in the Swiss parliamentary elections for the National Council on October 20th, 2019. 
 
Furthermore, a bivariate analysis between gender and age recoded in groups indicated that 
the majority (56.1%) of females in the sample have under 24 years of age, while the majority 
(45.9%) of male respondents report ages between 25 and 34. Also, the T-test for independent 
groups based on gender showed that in the sample, male respondents are slightly older (M = 28.12, 
SD = ± 6.43) than female respondents (M = 25.34, SD = ± 6.47). However, the mean age difference 
between gender is not significant to extrapolate to the population (i.e., t (192.209) = -3.52, p = .43). 
In terms of the vote, 48% of male respondents reported being not eligible, compared to 
29.9% of female respondents. Among those who voted, 53.9% are female, and 43.9% male.  
The household financial situation between gender; indicated that most female and male 
respondents are “Living comfortably” (i.e., F: 41.3%, M: 43.9%). While, with respect to the 
ideological orientation, both genders have a defined tendency towards the left-wing ideology, but 
the mean difference between female (M = 3.61, SD = 1.86) and male (M = 3.69 SD = ± 1.99) is 





The following chapter describes the different results obtained from the data analysis, all of which 
were carried out with SPSS 26.0 statistical analysis software. In specific, the first section proceeds 
with a descriptive overview of the predicted variables. The second part presents the anti-populist 
attitudes measurement factor analysis. The third and last section goes through the steps and 
obtained findings from hierarchical multiple regression analyses with two dependent variables of 
interest. 
Predictive Variables Descriptive Analysis 
Drawing from the mean values described in Table 4, we noticed that in the responses collected 
from our sample, political support lands on the positive side of the spectrum (M = 6.33, SD = ± 
1.46), indicating a general sense of trust and satisfaction with the Swiss political system and their 
institutions. 










M SD % 
Political Support  6 [0-10] .87  6.33 1.46  
Satisfaction w/ Covid-19 Response 3 [0-10] .88  6.44 1.93  
People are to blame Covid-19  3 [1-5] .74  3.47 .91  
Egalitarianism 4 [1-5] .73  3.56 .85  
Pluralism 2 [1-5]  .34 4.31 .61  
Institutions are to blame Covid-19 2 [1-5]  .51 3.71 .91  
Homogeneity & Virtuousness 3 [1-5]  .44 2.50 .85  
Anti-Elitism 3 [1-5] .59  3.25 .73  
Demand for Popular Sovereignty 2 [1-5] .76  3.35 .85  
Democratic Deficit 2 [-10-10]   1.74 2.23  
Elitism 1 [1-5]   2.93 1.14  
Entitlement 1 [1-5]   1.93 .97  
Social Media Trust 1 [0-10]   3.03 1.83  
News Media Trust 1 [0-10]   6.57 2.12  
Age (Years) 1 Continuous   26.23 6.57  
Nationality (Swiss = 1) 1 Dummy     64 




This positive tendency is also shared in opinions about the Satisfaction with Covid-19 
Response from institutions and public officials were on average, people expressed a general sense 
of approval with the response given to the sanitary crisis (M = 6.44, SD = ± 1.93).  
As it relates to the impressions on the causes of Covid-19 spread, survey participants seem 
to assign more responsibility to institutions actions (Institutions are to blame for Covid-19 spread, 
M = 3.71, SD = ± .91) than people’s behaviors during the crisis (People are to blame for Covid-
19 spread, M = 3.47, SD = ± .91).  
In terms of organizing principles, respondents tend to present a higher level of agreement 
with egalitarianism principles (M = 3.56, SD = ± .85), while the level of agreement with a sense 
of entitlement was considerably lower (M = 1.93, SD = ± .97). 
Concerning pluralism, the obtained results show that the sample scored quite high on this 
particular variable (M = 4.31, SD = ± .61), whereas elitism ranged from low to neutral scores (M 
= 2.93, SD = ± 1.14). 
Turning to media trust, respondents showed much higher confidence levels in national news 
media (M = 6.57, SD = ± 2.12) compared to alternative forms of information such as social media 
platforms like Facebook (M = 3.03, SD = ± 1.83). 
With respect to the constitutive dimensions of populist attitudes survey respondents denoted 
overall low levels of Homogeneity & Virtuousness (M = 2.50, SD = ± .85), and higher scores of 
Anti-Elitism (M = 3.25, SD = ± .73), and Demand for Popular Sovereignty (M = 3.35, SD = ± .85).  
Finally, as it was described in previous sections, the percentage of female respondents in the 
sample is 67%, with a mean age of 26 years, (M = 26.23, SD = ± 6.57), and a majority of Swiss 
nationals (64%) with respect to foreign respondents. 
Anti-Populist Attitudes 
Having briefly described the predictive variables in our study, we shift our attention to anti-
populism measurement and the creation of our dependent variable, for that, the 18 items intended 
to measure anti-populist attitudes were examined with Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and 




The results from the initial analysis, confirmed satisfactory factorability with sampling 
adequacy above the commonly recommended value (KMO =.81) and significant Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity (χ2(153) = 1673.427, p < .001) indicating that correlations between items were sufficiently 
large for EFA. From the analysis we obtain five factors with eigenvalues greater than the 1.0 
threshold. The initial five-factor structure accounted for 59% of the variance (Factor 1 = 25%; 
Factor 2 = 16%; Factor 3 = 7%; Factor 4 = 6%; Factor 5 = 6%, eigenvalues = 4.44, 2.83, 1.21, 
1.08, 1.04 respectively).  
However, to optimize the solution, items with communalities (h2) below .30 were eliminated 
as an indication of a lack of common variance with other items. In total, we excluded seven items 
from analysis (i.e., rw3-intolerant, rw6-emotional, rw7-pessimistic, lw1-pessimistic, apop3-
preserve, and apop4-ban) (see Appendix E, Table 10). 
 
Table 5. PAF for Items Measuring Anti-Populist Attitudes (N=304). 
N° Item  1 2 h2 M SD 
1 rw2 Right-wing populist parties or movements are dishonest .741 -.166 .486 4.28 .888 
2 rw4 
Right-wing populist parties or movements are 
unrespectable .716 -.292 .507 4.08 .967 
3 apop1 Populism threatens democracy .664 .167 .574 3.94 .978 
4 rw1 
Right-wing populist parties or movements are 
dangerous .643 -.308 .452 3.65 1.073 
5 rw5 
Right-wing populist parties or movements are 
unqualified .632 -.178 .339 2.4 1.192 
6 apop2 Populism is bad for democracy .624 .115 .397 2.77 .938 
7 lw4 
Left-wing populist parties or movements are 
unrespectable -.111 .793 .537 2.37 .972 
8 lw5 Left-wing populist parties or movements are dishonest -.145 .711 .443 2.62 .954 
9 lw3 Left-wing populist parties or movements are dangerous -.121 .654 .325 2.72 .911 
10 lw7 
Left-wing populist parties or movements are 
unqualified  .62 .537 3.64 1.047 
11 lw2 Left-wing populist parties or movements are intolerant  .611 .516 3.51 1.087 
 Explained variance 58% 36% 22%    
 Eigenvalues 3.91 2.41    
 Cronbach’s Alpha .83 .81    
Note. Factor analysis applying principle axis factoring and varimax rotation converged in x iterations; factor 




With the remaining 11 items, we ran again the PAF (KMO=.81, Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
χ2(55) = 1318.096, p < .001) and obtained two factors with eigenvalues above 1.0 accounting for 
58% of the variance (Factor 1 = 36%; Factor 2 = 22%, eigenvalues 3.91, 2.41 respectively).  
After rotation with the varimax method (see Table 5 above), all items presented loadings 
over .60, and only one item displayed a cross-loading above .30 (i.e., rw1-dangerous); however, 
the item has a strong primary factor loading of .64, so we decided to keep the item in the solution. 
In the resulting two-factor structure, all items related to anti-right-wing populism correlated 
to factor 1, with the addition “populism threatens democracy…” (i.e., apop1) and “populism is bad 
for democracy” (i.e., apop2); while all items of anti-left-wing populism correlated with factor 2. 
Internal consistency for each factor was examined, based on the primary loadings, obtaining 
satisfactory Cronbach alpha values’, Factor 1: Anti-right-wing populism (α = .83), and Factor 2: 
Anti-Left-wing populism (α = .81), and no substantial increments by eliminations of items. 
Composite scores were constructed for each factor, with higher scores indicating greater 
anti-populist attitudes. From the mean scores, we notice that Anti Right-wing Populism score 
considerably high with a negatively skewed distribution. Anti Left-Wing Populism, on the other 
hand, scored noticeably less and presented a positively skewed distribution. The skewness and 
kurtosis were within ranges of normal distribution. 
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics for the two Anti-Populist attitudes factor indices (N=304) 







M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
F1 Anti Right-Wing Populism 6 1-5 point .83 3.85 .74 -.37 -.14 
F2 Anti Left-Wing Populism 5 1-5 point .81 2.57 .75 .52 .96 
  
Anti-Populism Correlates 
In order to study the effect of selected variables on anti-populism, we conducted multiple linear 
regressions following our expectations of associations and the model of analysis presented in the 
Theoretical Framework chapter (Figure 2 in Theoretical Framework chapter). Explicitly, we used 
a hierarchical method of multiple regression to capture the influence and change in the variance as 
the variables were added into the model. 
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As described in the previous section, the factor analysis identified two factors of anti-
populist attitudes defined as Anti Right-Wing Populism and Anti Left-Wing Populism. From which 
two distinct composite scores were created. We first analyze the Anti Right-Wing Populism 
correlates and then move on to Anti Left-Wing Populism to review the results comparatively.  
Anti Right-Wing Populism Correlates 
For the analysis of Anti Right-Wing Populism correlates, we tested 17 predictor variables, from 
which two were dichotomous (i.e., gender and nationality) and the rest 15 predictors at the interval 
measurement level. The dependent variable also was measured at the interval level. Furthermore, 
respondents (i.e., cases) with missing values were excluded from all the analyses with the 
implementation of the listwise deletion option in SPSS. 
The composite score of our dependent variable (see Table 6 above), as we previously noted, 
shows that the mean values (M = 3.85, SD = ±.74) are located above a neutral position “Neither 
Agree nor Disagree” represented by value 3 in the 1-5 Likert scale, in which higher scores denoted 
higher levels of anti-populist attitudes. Hence, the data obtained from our sample lend to indicate 
the presence of Anti Right-Wing Populism at the individual level. 
Prior to conducting the analyses, we confirmed that a sample size of 301 was deemed 
adequate to run 17 predictor variables in the analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014). We also filtered 
one outlier (i.e., cases with residuals higher than ±3) that could be a source of concern for the 
model fit (i.e., case 23).  
Additionally, we tested if the multiple regression assumptions were met for our sample. In 
specific, we found that the Durbin-Watson value of 1.86 (i.e., closer to 2.0) exhibited that the 
independence of residuals was met. Concerning homoscedasticity, we located that the residuals’ 
variances were reasonably similar for the different values of the dependent variable (see Figure 3 
Appendix F). Although far from perfect, the distributed residuals were well adjusted to the normal 
distribution curve (see Figure 4 and 5 Appendix F). Furthermore, with a Kolmogorov-Smimov 
statistical significance p = .20 higher than .05, we confirmed the normal distribution of residuals 
assumption in our sample.  
Finally, the collinearity between predictor variables was evaluated, ratifying the absence of 
correlations above .80 (see Appendix G); moreover, the statistics of Tolerance and VIF were all 
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within acceptable limits, that is, VIF below 10 and tolerance statistic (1/VIF) above .10 (Field, 
2009); hence the assumption of multicollinearity was deemed to have been met.  
After the assumptions’ corroboration, we ran a six-stage hierarchical multiple regression 
with Anti Right-Wing Populism as the dependent variable (i.e., constant) in which we tested the 
different sets of exploratory hypotheses that were drawn from the theoretical framework.  
We first report the findings that examine the effect of socio-demographic variations (Model 
1, H1). Secondly, we present the results from the analysis of the baseline variables for anti-
populism, which incorporate elitism and pluralism, in addition to the three dimensions of populist 
attitudes (i.e., Homogeneity and Virtuousness, Anti-Elitism, Demand for Popular Sovereignty) 
(Model 2, H2a, H2b, and H2c).  
Afterward, we integrate the analysis and results about the influence of media trust (Model 
3, H3a, and H3b), the impressions of the handling of a crisis (i.e., Covid-19 outbreak) (Model 4 
H4a, H4b, and H4c), and the legitimacy and support of current democratic and political systems 
of government (Model 5, H5a, and H5b).  
Finally, we introduced two more variables in order to examine the effect of organizing 
principles of entitlement and egalitarianism (Model 6, H6a, and H6b). A summary of the 
principal results from the analysis and each of the models presented in Table 7 below. 
Socio-demographic Correlates 
H1: Gender, Age, and Nationality are correlated to Anti Right-Wing Populism. 
 
From our first analysis in (Model 1), we find that the chosen group of socio-demographic variables 
had a peripheral, but significant effect on our dependent variable, accounting for 3% of the 
variation (F (3, 297) = 3.16, p = .025). 
It also reveals that among the integrated predictors, age was the only one associated with 
Anti Right-Wing Populism, whereas gender and nationality individually were unrelated at this 
point. In turn, this model only reveals that older respondents were more likely to score higher on 
Anti Right-Wing Populism. Relatively, an increase of one year in the respondents’ age increases 
by .01 the score on the dependent variable.  
It is important to mention that the age effect remained mostly unchanged until the 
introduction of variables on democracy, political support, and organizing principles in Model 5 
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and 6. While nationality change to a significant inversely correlated predictor in Model 3, 5, and 
6, when controlling for the previously mentioned variables in addition to Media Trust predictors 
in Model 3. For instance, revealing that Swiss respondents are .14 less Anti Right-Wing Populist 
than the non-Swiss (Model 5 and 6).  
This suggests that in the sample, nationality might be a more salient socio-demographic 
predictor than age when controlling for additional theoretical relevant variables. Moreover, these 
findings allow us to confirm partially our initial expectations.  
Furthermore, a plausible interpretation of the age finding could be drawn from adulthood’s 
contrasting experience between younger and older generations in terms of the relative economic 
hardships and grievances. An anti-populist discourse that favors the maintenance of current forms 
governance could have more resonance with generations whose lifespan has allowed them to 
experience some realization their socio-economic expectations under those circumstances, while 
populist discourse, usually associated with change and disruption of established systems, could be 
more attractive to younger respondents.  
Concerning nationality, the finding that Swiss nationals in the sample are less Anti Right-
Wing Populist than their non-Swiss counterparts might be entangled with respondents’ familiarity 
and understanding (or lack thereof) of Swiss politics and its extended history of right-wing 
populism, as well as with the proximity to other national and political contexts. 
Populism Dimensions, Elitism & Pluralism 
H2a: Elitism is positively correlated to Anti Right-Wing Populism. 
H2b: Pluralism is positively correlated to Anti Right-Wing Populism. 
H2c: Homogeneity & Virtuousness is negatively correlated to Anti Right-Wing Populism. 
H2d: Anti-Elitism is negatively correlated to Anti Right-Wing Populism. 
H2e: Demand for Popular Sovereignty is negatively correlated to Anti Right-Wing Populism. 
 
In Model 2, we introduced five variables, which enhanced the overall predictive capacity of the 
model to 8% according to the R2, more precisely adding a 5% from Model 1 (F (8, 292) = 3.00, p 
= 003) and reaching statistical significance levels. In this model, the results indicate that the 
populist attitude dimension on Homogeneity & Virtuousness was the most important for the model 
according to the standardized coefficient (β = -.17), displaying a negative relationship with the 
dependent variable, as it was expected.  
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A unit increase leads to a .15 decrease in the Anti Right-Wing Populism score. The variable 
stayed significant until Model 5 and 6, suggesting the relevance of the effect added by democratic 
deficit, political support, entitlement, and egalitarianism. 
Demand for Popular Sovereignty dimension was also negatively correlated, but only 
appeared statistically related as unique variables until Model 6, when controlling for 
egalitarianism and entitlement. In accordance with the expectations, it shows an inverse 
correlation. A unit of increase in the predictor decreased by .12 the score on Anti Right-Wing 
Populism. On the other hand, Anti-Elitism remained unrelated to the dependent variable in all the 
models. 
We suspect that the inverse effect of the Homogeneity & Virtuousness dimension might 
also be motivated by a greater sense of rejection of nativist and nationalism commonly proposed 
by radical right-wing political projects (Moffitt, 2018), which were given as examples in our 
survey questionnaire. Here, the opposition could be interpreted as a reaction against racism, 
xenophobia, and minority intolerance associated with political projects which core focus is placed 
on a horizontal exclusionary differentiation (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017). An interpretation that 
is supported by Model 5 and 6, with the effect overridden by democratic deficit and egalitarianism 
that functions as a proxy of Left-Wing ideological positioning. 
Moreover, the found inverse effect of Demand for Popular Sovereignty might be a result 
of a reluctance to alter or question the legitimacy of an already widely established model of direct 
democracy in Switzerland, but also it may be a response to a greater sense of aversion towards 
Sovereignty related constitutional amendments like the Self-Determination Initiative, which 
among other measures, proposed the elimination of ultimate share decision-making with 
supranational bodies (Mueller & Heidelberger, 2020) this rejection aligns with the anti-populist 
discourse of initiatives like Operation Libero. 
With respect to Elitism and Pluralism, only the former was significant, its association was 
positive as expected, and it was the second most important variable in the model (β = .11), a unit 
increase leads to a .07 increase in the Anti Right-Wing Populism score, which in turns implies the 
Anti Right-Wing populism preference for the continuity of the technocracy of politics. This 
variable significance remains through most models of analysis, except for Model 3, which added 
variables on the Covid-19 outbreak. 
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Conversely, pluralism was completely absent from predicting opposition towards populism, 
contrary to our hypothesis (H2b). Which in turn, might lead us to question this common theoretical 
assumption, expressed in the relevant work of Mudde and Rovira (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 
2017, p. 7), bringing to notice the need for further exploration, perhaps with the inclusion of control 
variables that have greater predictive influence over pluralism. 
Media Trust Effect 
H3a: National News Media Trust is positively correlated to Anti Right-Wing Populism. 
H3b: Social Media Trust is negatively correlated to Anti Right-Wing Populism. 
 
Model 3 increases the overall predictive capacity of the model to 10% according to the R2, adding 
a 3% from Model 2, with the integration of the variables on National News Media and Social 
Media Trust (F (10, 290) = 3.57, p < .001) and reaching established levels of significance.  
The impact of National News Media Trust is significant and positive as expected, meaning 
that more trust in the information provided by National News outlets tends to have a positive 
association with displaying Anti Right-Wing Populist attitudes. Precisely, a unit increase in News 
Media Trust is translated in .04 higher dependent variable score.  
On the other hand, Social Media Trust, which is one of the most important variables in the 
model (β = -.16), as it was expected, correlates negatively, and its effect is significant, a unit 
increase in Social Media Trust lead a decrease of the degree of the individual level of Anti Right-
Wing Populism by nearly .07, holding all the other variables constant.  
Both findings suggest the avoidance of out-group informational sources in which national 
traditional media outlets are often presented as services of higher quality and credibility, due to its 
public funding support or professionalization proclivity, while alternative emergent sources of 
information are seen as informal, “popular” and subject of skepticism for social groups like the 







H4a: Satisfaction w/ Covid-19 Response is positively correlated to Anti Right-Wing Populism. 
H4b: Institutions are to blame for Covid-19 is negatively correlated to Anti Right-Wing 
Populism. 
H4c: People are to blame for Covid-19 is positively correlated to Anti Right-Wing Populism. 
 
In Model 4, we introduced the three variables that relate to the Covid-19 outbreak, increasing the 
explanatory capacity of the model significantly by 20% with an R2 Change of 9% (F (13, 287) = 
5.37, p < .001).  
With respect to the added variables, contrary to expectations, Institutions are to blame for 
Covid-19 spread presents a positive unique correlation with the dependent variable. A unit increase 
in the scale of the predictor variable leads an increase of .24 in the Anti Right-Wing Populism 
score, and it is the most important variable in the model (β = .30), whereas People are to blame 
for the Covid-19 spread had a highly negative effect, also contrary to expectations. Showing that 
for a unit increase in that scale, the Anti Right-Wing Populism score decreased by .19. Satisfaction 
with Covid-19 Response, in this model, did not present a significant effect.  
As mentioned before, there is a non-trivial complexity in the interpretation of these variables 
and its influence on Anti-Populism stances, given that the survey spanned over the precise time 
period where the initial effects of the Covid-19 outbreak and institutional level response took place.  
However, plausible interpretations of the greater sense of fault over institutions may derive 
from the globalized nature of the crisis and the response given by other countries in the region, 
especially those with right-wing populist parties in government, as well as due to judgments over 
the actions of particular politicians and public officials that dominated in the news media cycle. 
This contrasts with the general sense of approval (M = 6.44 on a 0-10 range, SD = ± 1.93) of the 
response given to the sanitary crisis from national institutions and public officials in Switzerland. 
Democratic Deficit & Political Support   
H5a: Democratic Deficit is negatively correlated to Anti Right-Wing Populism. 
H5b: Political Support is positively correlated to Anti Right-Wing Populism. 
 
In Model 5, the explanatory capacity improved to 30% according to the R2, with an R2 Change of 
10% by adding two more variables (F (15, 285) = 8.10, p < .001). In specific, Democratic Deficit 
shows a positive statistically significant correlation with the Anti Right-Wing Populism variable. 
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Contrary to expectations, respondents who show Anti Right-Wing Populists attitudes also have a 
greater sense of democratic deficit. A unit of increase in the scale is translated as a .12 increase in 
the individual-level of Anti Right-Wing Populism.  
Although opposed to our expectation, this finding might be in line with the interpretation 
that democracy has already been successfully undermined by the rise and presence of populist 
discourse and representatives in power, all of which have inferred a global crisis of democracy, 
especially associated with authoritarian leaders in governments. In the Swiss scenario, the 
popularity and long history of political intervention of right-wing populist party SVP may already 
be considered as an obstacle to satisfied democratic standards. 
On the other hand, Political Support was not significant as a unique predictor in the 
regression analysis, meaning that this sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the 
associated null-hypothesis nor confirm our expectations (H5b). 
Organizing principles: Entitlement & Egalitarianism 
H6a: Entitlement is positively correlated to Anti Right-Wing Populism. 
H6b: Egalitarianism is correlated to Anti Right-Wing Populism. 
 
Model 6 shows the final stage of the hierarchical regression analysis, here we added two variables 
that improved the overall explanatory capacity to 37% with an R2 Change of 7% (F (17, 283) = 
9.57, p < .001). 
Both Entitlement and Egalitarianism presented significant unique effects when controlling 
for the rest of the variables. Entitlement, contrary to expectations, was inversely correlated with 
Anti Right-Wing Populism; a unit increase in the scale implicated a .09 decrease in the dependent 
variable, while Egalitarianism correlated positively with the dependent variable. A unit of increase 
leads to an increment by .24 in the Anti Right-Wing Populism score. These findings pair with each 
other are consistent with the general left-wing orientation of the sample and, consequently oppose 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Anti Left-Wing Populism Correlates 
For the analysis of Anti Left-Wing Populism correlates, we tested the same 17 predictor variables, 
excluded any missing values with the listwise deletion option in SPSS. 
The composite score of our dependent variable (see Table 6 above) shows that the mean 
values (M = 2.57, SD = ±.75) are located near the neutral position “Neither agree nor Disagree” 
represented by value 3 in the 1-5 Likert scale, in which higher scores denoted higher levels of anti-
populist attitudes. Consequently, the data obtained from our sample lend to indicate a lack of clear 
tendency with respect to Anti Left-Wing populism at the individual level in the sample, yet in 
order to compare with the regression results previously obtained for Anti Right-Wing Populism, 
we applied the same six-stage hierarchical multiple regression for the Anti Left-Wing Populism 
variable. 
Similar to our prior analysis, we evaluated the fitness of the models and the extrapolation of 
the results to the rest of the population by testing if the multiple regression assumptions were met 
for our sample. In specific, a sample size of 300 was deemed adequate to run 17 predictor variables 
in the analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014). We also filtered two outliers (i.e., cases with residuals 
higher than ±3) after diagnosis (i.e., case 24 and 183).  
Furthermore, we found a Durbin-Watson value of 1.99 (i.e., closer to 2.0), which exhibited 
that the independence of residuals was met. For homoscedasticity, we found that residuals’ 
variances are reasonably similar for the different values of the dependent variable (see Figure 6 
Appendix F). The residuals distribution was also well adjusted to the normal distribution curve 
(see Figure 7 and 8 Appendix F); moreover, the Kolmogorov-Smimov statistical significance p = 
.20, higher than .05, prove the normal distribution of residuals assumption in our sample.  
Lastly, the collinearity between predictor variables was evaluated, confirming the absence 
of correlations above .80 (see Appendix H); also, the statistics of Tolerance and VIF were all within 
acceptable limits, that is, VIF below 10 and tolerance statistic (1/VIF) above .1 (Field, 2009), hence 
the assumption of multicollinearity was deemed to have been met.  
After confirming the assumptions, we run the six-stage hierarchical multiple regression with 
Anti Left-Wing Populism as the dependent variable (i.e., constant) (available in Table 8) to test the 




H1: Gender, Age, and Nationality are correlated to Anti Left-Wing Populism. 
 
The findings in Model 1 show that the socio-demographic variables do not have a predictive 
capacity on the dependent variable, (F (3, 296) = .083, p = .970). None of the variables had a 
unique significant effect on Anti Left-Wing Populism. These results were maintained in all 
models; hence, contrary to our proposal (Hypothesis 1), we cannot reject the null-hypothesis that 
their effects are simultaneously equal to zero in the population. 
Populism Dimensions, Elitism & Pluralism 
H2a: Elitism is positively correlated to Anti Left-Wing Populism. 
H2b: Pluralism is positively correlated to Anti Left-Wing Populism. 
H2c: Homogeneity & Virtuousness is negatively correlated to Anti Left-Wing Populism. 
H2d: Anti-Elitism is negatively correlated to Anti Left-Wing Populism. 
H2e: Demand for Popular Sovereignty is negatively correlated to Anti Left-Wing Populism. 
 
When introducing new variables on populist attitudes, elitism, and pluralism in Model 2, 
the predictive capacity of the model went up marginally to 2%, but remain statistically insignificant 
(F (8, 291) = .075, p = .645), with all its variables unrelated as unique predictors of Anti Left-Wing 
Populism, except for Demand for Popular Sovereignty, which complies with the lowest level of 
statistical significance in Model 2 and 3 indicating a negative effect. However, models 2 and 3 are 
not significant; the variable unique association was lost in subsequent models, as a result of the 
integration variables on Covid-19, democracy, political support, and organizing principles. Which, 
in turn, makes it harder to confirm our proposed hypotheses (2c, 2d, 2e) with the available data.   
These findings suggest that opposition to Left-Wing populism is plausibly a result of the 
use of populism as a signifier for other causes of antagonism, including a contrary ideological 
stance.  
On the other hand, elitism gain statistical significance for its inverse correlation with Anti 
Left-Wing Populism only in Model 5 with a .07 coefficient. This effect was lost in the last model 
when controlling for organizing principles. Pluralism remained unrelated as a unique predictor in 
all the analyses. For both variables, our hypotheses (2a and 2b) were rejected by the data. 
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Media Trust  
H3a: National News Media Trust is positively correlated to Anti Left-Wing Populism. 
H3b: Social Media Trust is negatively correlated to Anti Left-Wing Populism. 
 
Model 3 which added variables on media trust stayed statistically not significant (F (10, 289) = 
1.46, p = .153). Nevertheless, National News Media Trust as a unique predictor controlling for the 
rest of the variables, reached the significance level threshold in four out four models, showing a 
negative correlation with Anti Left-Wing Populism, contrary to our expectations (3a). A unit of 
increase in News Media Trust leads to a .08 decrease on the level of Anti Left-Wing Populism 
according to the coefficient Model 5, and .05 in Model 6. Social Media Trust stayed unrelated to 
the dependent variable in all the models of analysis, contrary to our initial hypothesis (3b).  
Covid-19 Impressions 
H4a: Satisfaction w/ Covid-19 Response is positively correlated to Anti Left-Wing Populism. 
H4b: Institutions are to blame for Covid-19 is negatively correlated to Anti Left-Wing Populism. 
H4c: People are to blame for Covid-19 is positively correlated to Anti Left-Wing Populism. 
 
Model 4 which integrated variables on the impression of Covid-19 did not reach the conventional 
levels of statistical significance (F (13, 286) = 1.48, p = .125). Out of the three added variables, 
just Institutions are to blame for Covid-19 spread showed a unique inverse significant effect when 
controlling for the rest.  
This effect, which agreed with our expectations (5b), was only sustained in Model 5 with 
a lower coefficient and level of significance, but not on the final model. People are to blame for 
Covid-19 and Satisfaction with Covid-19 Response remained not related to Anti Left-Wing 
Populism for all the models rejecting our connected hypothesis (4a, 4c). 
Democratic Deficit & Political Support   
H5a: Democratic Deficit is negatively correlated to Anti Left-Wing Populism. 
H5b: Political Support is positively correlated to Anti Left-Wing Populism. 
 
On the other hand, Model 5, which added variables on Democratic Deficit and Political Support, 
improve the significant explanatory capacity of the model to 12% according to the R2, F (15, 284) 
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= 2.59, p = .001. Here, agreeing with our initial expectations, Democratic Deficit had a significant 
negative correlation with the Anti Left-Wing Populism variable. 
 In specific, a unit of increase in the scale is translated (Hypothesis 5a) as a .05 decrease in 
the individual-level of Anti Left-Wing Populism. Indicating that rejection towards Left-Wing 
populism may be based on different conceptions and contentions over how democracy should 
operate and that the left-wing populist complaints represent the limits of a functioning democracy. 
In this model, Political Support also reveals a significant association. In specific, it has a 
positive correlation as it was expected in our hypothesis (5b), indicating that a unit increase in the 
predictor increase by .09 the dependent variable. The rest of the predictors in the model were 
significantly unrelated to Anti Left-Wing Populism. 
It is worth noting that both variables lost their significant predictive capacity and decreased 
their coefficients in Model 6 when controlling for the effect of entitlement and egalitarianism. This 
means that these variables are more powerful predictors of Anti Left-Wing Populism. 
Organizing principles: Entitlement & Egalitarianism 
H6a: Entitlement is positively correlated to Anti Left-Wing Populism. 
H6b: Egalitarianism is correlated to Anti Left-Wing Populism. 
 
In the final Model 6, the added variables on organizing principles improved the overall 
explanatory capacity to 29% according to the R2 at a significant level (F (17, 282) = 6.87, p < 
.001).  
From the added variables, Entitlement and Egalitarianism, only the latter, which is the most 
important variable in the model, according to the β coefficient, presented a significant unique 
inverse correlation with the dependent variable. A unit of increase in egalitarianism leads a 
decrease by .43 in the Anti Left-Wing Populism score. The inclusion of the variable overruled 
most of the effect of the rest of the variables, which implies the interpretation that opposition to 
Left-Wing Populism could be mostly driven by opposite ideological orientation guarded behind 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This thesis provides a first attempt of anti-populism measurement at the individual level and its 
correlates. Our contribution stems from the scientific literature on the demand-side of populism 
and the discursive-performative critical analysis of the populism/anti-populism divide. 
Methodologically, it was executed by means of a quantitative research design with a primary cross-
sectional web-based survey for data collection and a convenience sample of 305 students and 
researches from Swiss Universities in 2020.  
In the context of our specific sample, we were able to define two latent factors of anti-
populism: Anti Right-Wing Populism and Anti Left-Wing Populism. The data obtained lend to 
indicate the presence of high scores of Anti Right-Wing Populism at the individual level, whereas, 
in the case of Anti Left-Wing Populism, the information collected showed a lack of a clear 
tendency, with an average score rather neutral on the 1 to 5-point Likert scale. A finding that seems 
aligned with the general left-wing ideological orientation of our sample. 
With respect to the correlates of Anti-populism, we found that in the sample, Anti Right-
Wing Populism is more prevalent when the respondent has non-Swiss nationality and when its 
age increases (H1). The analysis also pointed out that Anti Right-Wing populism opposes 
populism attitudes in the Homogeneity & Virtuousness and Demand for Popular Sovereignty 
dimensions (H2c, H2e), greater levels of elitism also prove to be linked to the dependent variable, 
pointing out the technocracy of politics preference (H2a).  
 Moreover, we were able to find that National News Media Trust was positively correlated 
to Anti Right-Wing Populism, while social media trust was inversely correlated. The obtained 
information aligned with our expectations about the avoidance of out-group and the particular anti-
populist political identity formation (H3a, H3b). 
 Regarding the variables about impressions of the Covid-19 outbreak, we found an effect 
contrary to our expectations (H4b, H4c). Institutions are to blame for Covid-19 spread was 
positively correlated, while People are to blame for Covid-19 spread was negatively correlated to 
Anti Right-Wing Populism. These results might be attributed to the globalized scope of the 
pandemic in which respondents could be extending their judgments to foreign governments’ 
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responses, especially those of populist leaders. The effect of these variables will also benefit from 
future research that can assess change over time in the opinions, more nuance in the question items, 
as well as the control of other relevant variables. 
Democratic deficit also emerged as an important predictor, but contrary to our expectation 
(H5a), it positively affected Anti Right-Wing Populism, meaning that a greater sense of deficit, 
measured from the difference between democratic aspirations and satisfaction with democracy, 
will result in a greater level of Anti Right-Wing Populism.  
A plausible explanation of this finding comes from the idea that democracy is interpreted 
as already being harmed or damaged by populism presence in different political contexts, affecting 
the overall satisfaction with democracy standards that were previously attained, also it is important 
to notice the predictive capacity (R2 Change 10%) added by this variable. 
On the other hand, entitlement and egalitarianism show to be correlated to the dependent 
variable, partially confirming our expectations. However, entitlement specifically had a positional 
effect contrary to our hypothesis (H6a) by having a negative effect on the level of Anti Right-
Wing Populism. Egalitarianism indicated a positive correlation intuitively aligned with an 
opposition to common Right-Wing political projects. The higher the levels of egalitarianism, the 
higher the opposition to Right-Wing Populism (H6b).  
Out of 17 predictor variables tested for correlation, 12 reached the established levels of 
significance and proved to be correlated with Anti Right-Wing Populism. On the other hand, when 
controlling for all the selected variables, only 9 reached significance and correlation.  
For Anti Left-Wing Populism, we found fewer variables with a significant association, 
with only 7 out of 17. Among the populism dimensions, only Demand for Popular Sovereignty 
presented a significant inverse correlation, as expected (H2e), while elitism, contrary to our 
expectations (H2a), showed a significant inverse correlation. 
Another interesting finding, differing from our initial hypothesis (H3b), is the inverse 
correlation of National News Media Trust, which was slightly reduced in the level of significance 
and coefficient when controlling for entitlement and egalitarianism.   
Regarding the impressions about Covid-19, only Institutions are to blame for Covid-19 
spread showed statistical significance and inverse correlation, supporting our expectation (H4b). 
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Similarly, in line with our hypotheses (H5a), Democratic deficit had a significant negative 
association with the dependent variable, while Political Support presented a positive correlation 
(H5b).  
Finally, in Model 6, when controlling for all variables, only egalitarianism, out of the two 
added variables, indicated a high coefficient and level of significance affecting Anti Left-Wing 
Populism inversely. A unit of increase in egalitarianism leads a decrease of .43 in the Anti Left-
Wing Populism score (H6b). Moreover, in this model, only egalitarianism and National News 
Media Trust reached the significance level. 
In general, we can conclude that Demand for Popular Sovereignty might be a good 
predictor of Anti-populism, as it correlates significantly and negatively for both Anti Right-Wing 
Populism and Anti Left-Wing Populism.  
Comparatively, we can observe that besides fewer unique significant variables and 
different percentages of explained variance, the difference between Anti Right-Wing Populism 
and Anti Left-Wing Populism lies in the effect of five correlated variables. Anti Right-Wing 
Populism, in general, shows more disapproval to the status-quo (based on the positive correlations 
of democratic deficit and Institutions are to blame for Covid-19), in contrast to Anti Left-Wing 
Populism. On the other hand, elitism, National Media Trust, and egalitarianism had a positive 
effect on Anti Right-Wing Populism and a negative effect on Anti Left-Wing Populism. 
Moreover, our theoretical framework seems more adjusted to Anti Right-Wing Populism 
in terms of the explained variance (i.e., Anti Right-Wing Populism R2 = 37%, Anti Left-Wing 
Populism R2 = 29%, both in Model 6) and in the overall alignment with our expectations. 
Nevertheless, Anti Left-Wing Populism also agreed with our expectations in three important 
variables that operationalized ideas from our theoretical framework (i.e., Democratic Deficit, 
Institutions are to for Covid-19, and Political Support), all of which will greatly benefit from 
further empirical analyses, preferably with a representative sample. 
Generally, the findings also showed how anti-populism is greatly influenced by a left-right 
wing ideological stance, which is reflected in the egalitarianism variable. Another interesting 
result is that pluralism was unrelated to both dependent variables in opposition to our expectations 
and populism literature, which might be worth exploring further.  
Furthermore, we find that the explanatory capacity of anti-populism with 17 predictor 
variables is fairly low (~29% to ~37%), which suggest that our theoretical framework will greatly 
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benefit from the incorporation of other relevant arguments and complementary approaches, as well 
as from an enhanced operationalization of conceptual variables. 
In terms of the methodological design, we were able to test the semantic differential 
technique for the anti-populism measurement in an effort to link new evidence and a well-known 
approach that, due to its focus on bipolar meaning abstractions, had the potential to facilitate a 
suitable representation of individuals attitudes concerning the antagonistic nature of the 
populist/anti-populist phenomena.  
However, we find that a limitation of the study could arise from the use of specific populist 
examples from Left- and Right-Wing ideological orientations in the survey questions constructed 
for the anti-populism measurement, where this information might function as a significant source 
of bias. A suitable alternative could be the use of vignettes questions12 in which hypothetical 
examples describing populist representations in the media, political figures, political parties, or 
specific actions are presented to the respondent for its evaluation. This particular question design 
could also help in the operationalization of more complex arguments of the proposed theoretical 
framework, like the performance and mediation of a crisis and nuances in democratic 
representation preferences. 
For future research on the topic, we find that it will be interesting to apply mix-methods 
combining content analysis by means of data mining on media outlets to study the supply-side of 
anti-populism and survey research to measure the demand-side at the individual level. Moreover, 
we will also find relevant to address how anti-populism might be acted upon, meaning how it can 
be related to specific political participation and electoral preference.  
For now, although exploratory and limited by a convenience sample, this work provides 
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Paper self-administered survey questionnaire.  




Survey on  
Current Social Affaires 
 
This survey is part of a Master’s degree research on public opinion at the University of 
Lausanne. Your answers will help us to understand better the opinions and impressions 
people have on different social and political current phenomena.  
 
Your participation is completely voluntary, your responses are anonymous, and all the 
information will be kept fully confidential. 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Please read the instructions and each of the questions carefully. There are no "right" or 
"wrong" answers, so we invite you to respond as spontaneously and sincerely as possible.  
Respond to every question by marking one box  with the option that best represents your 
opinion. Usually, the first answer that comes to mind is the most faithful. 
If you have any questions, don’t hesitate to contact: 
Researcher:  Daniela Chacón-Mendoza 
daniela.chaconmendoza@unil.ch 
Supervisor: Prof. Christian Staerklé, Institute of Psychology, UNIL 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study! 
April 2020  
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For each of the following questions, please respond by marking one box  with the option 
that best represents your opinion. 
1. How interested would you say you are in politics? 
 
Very interested 1 
Quite interested 2 
Hardly interested 3 
Not at all interested 4 
 
2. There are different ways of getting involved in politics. During the last 12 months, have 
you participated in any of the following? 
 Yes No 
2.1 A political party, social movement, or action group? 1 0 
2.2 A protest or public demonstration? 1 0 
 
3. Did you vote in the last Swiss parliamentary elections for the National Council on 
October 20th, 2019? 
No 0 
Yes 1 
Not eligible 3 
 
4. Generally speaking, how happy would you say you are nowadays? Please provide one 
answer between 0 and 10, where 0 means ‘extremely unhappy’ and 10 means ‘extremely happy’. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
                   Extremely Unhappy                               Extremely Happy 
 
5. All things considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you nowadays with… 
 
5.1. …your life as a whole? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
5.2. …the way democracy works in Switzerland? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
5.3. …the way the Swiss government is doing its job? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
5.4. …the present state of the economy in 








6. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't 




7. Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the 






8. On a score between 0 and 10, where 0 means ‘no trust at all’, and 10 ‘complete trust’, 
how much do you personally trust, if at all, the information you can get through… 
 
8.1. …national news media organizations? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
8.2. …social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter 
or Snapchat? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
8.3. …friends and family? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
9. Once again, on a score between 0 and 10, how much do you personally trust, if at all, 
each of the following institutions? 
  
9.1 The Swiss parliament (National Council & Council 
of States)? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
9.2 Political parties in Switzerland? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
9.3 Swiss politicians? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 






0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Most people can be 
trusted 
You can’t be 
too careful 
Most people try to 
take advantage of me 
Most people  
try to be fair 
No trust at all Complete trust 
No trust at all Complete trust 
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10. In this section, we would like to know to what extent do you agree or disagree with the 











10.1 It is important to listen to people who are different from 
me. Even when I disagree with them, I still want to 
understand them. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10.2 In a democracy, it is important to make compromises 
among differing viewpoints. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10.3 To accept the existence of different and opposing opinions 
ultimately means that I will have to fight for my own 
beliefs. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10.4 In general, ordinary people can be trusted to understand 
our nation’s problems. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10.5 Our countries would be governed better if important 
decisions were only made by professionals and experts. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
11. In politics, people sometimes talk about 'left' and 'right'. Where would you place 
yourself on this scale, where 0 means ‘far-left’ and 10 means ‘far-right’? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
                                   Far-Left         Far-Right 
12. Below you will find different statements about politicians and people’s involvement in 










12.1. Politicians very quickly lose touch with ordinary people. 1 2 3 4 5 
12.2. Politicians talk too much and take too little action. 1 2 3 4 5 
12.3. People like me have no influence on what the government 
does. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12.4. In general, ordinary people are of good and honest character. 1 2 3 4 5 
12.5. Most ordinary people share similar values and interests. 1 2 3 4 5 
12.6. Although the Swiss are very different from each other, when 
it comes down to truly important decisions about how society 
should work, they all tend to think the same. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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12.7. The people should have the final say on the most important 
political issues by voting on them directly in referendums. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12.8. The people should be asked whenever important decisions 
are taken. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12.9. The people, not the politicians, should make our most 
important policy decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
13. There are many different views as to what makes a society fair or unfair. How much do 










13.1.  I think that, by and large, people get what they deserve. 1 2 3 4 5 
13.2. A society is fair when it takes care of those who are poor and in 
need regardless of what they give back to society. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13.3. A society is fair when hard-working people are properly 
rewarded for their efforts. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13.4. A society is fair when people from families with high social 
status enjoy privileges in their lives. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13.5. A society is fair when wealth is evenly redistributed among all 
of the people.  
1 2 3 4 5 
13.6. For a society to be fair, differences in people's standard of living 
should be small. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13.7. Large differences in people's incomes are acceptable to 
properly reward differences in talents and efforts. 












In this section, we would like to know your general impressions about specific political affairs, 
in particular populism. 
 
Populism refers to a way of political thinking that opposes “ordinary people” 
against the “establishment” or “the elite”. Many political parties and social 
movements, from the left and the right, have adopted populist ideas and 
discourses, claiming to represent the will of the people. 
  
14. In the following questions, we will show you a list of paired opposing adjectives. Please 
mark the box  with the option that comes closer to your own impression about right- 
and left-wing populist parties or movements.  
 
14.1 For you, in general, right-wing populist parties or movements such as BREXIT (UK), 
The Swiss People’s Party (Switzerland), or The Republican Party lead by Donald Trump 
(US) are? 
 Very Somewhat Neither/nor Somewhat Very  
Dangerous  -2 -1 0 1 2 Harmless 
Honest  -2 -1 0 1 2 Dishonest 
Intolerant  -2 -1 0 1 2 Tolerant 
Respectable  -2 -1 0 1 2 Unrespectable 
Qualified  -2 -1 0 1 2 Unqualified 
Emotional  -2 -1 0 1 2 Rational 
Optimistic  -2 -1 0 1 2 Pessimistic 
 
14.2 For you, in general, left-wing populist parties or movements such as Podemos 
(Spain), La France Insoumise lead by Jean-Luc Mélenchon (France), or The Democratic 
Party candidate Bernie Sanders (US) are? 
 Very Somewhat Neither/nor Somewhat Very  
Pessimistic  -2 -1 0 1 2 Optimistic 
Emotional  -2 -1 0 1 2 Rational 
Tolerant  -2 -1 0 1 2 Intolerant 
Harmless  -2 -1 0 1 2 Dangerous 
Respectable  -2 -1 0 1 2 Unrespectable 
Dishonest  -2 -1 0 1 2 Honest 




15. How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On a 
scale of 0-10, where 0 means it is ‘not at all important’ and 10 means ‘absolutely 






16. Now, we are going to present some pairs of short statements. Please, indicate which 


























Populism threatens democracy.  
 
-2 -1 0 1 2 Populism protects democracy. 
       
Populism is good for democracy. 
 
-2 -1 0 1 2 Populism is bad for democracy. 
       
We should try to preserve 
democracy as is currently working in 
Switzerland. 
 
-2 -1 0 1 2 
We should try to change democracy 
as is currently working in 
Switzerland. 
       
Democracies should ban populist 
parties and movements that are 
radical. 
 
-2 -1 0 1 2 
Democracies should allow populist 
parties and movements even if they 
are radical. 
 
17. In this section, please indicate to what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the 









17.1. I feel deprived when I think about what I have, compared 
to what other people like me have. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17.2. I feel privileged compared to other people like me. 1 2 3 4 5 
17.3. I feel dissatisfied with what I have compared to what other 
people like me have. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Absolutely 
important 




This section will present some questions about the coronavirus outbreak (COVID-19). 
 
18. How much of a threat, if any, is the coronavirus (Covid-19) outbreak for …  
 Very high High Moderate Low Very low 
18.1. … your personal and family health? 1 2 3 4 5 
18.2. … your household financial situation?  1 2 3 4 5 
 
19. Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak 
response given by …  
 
19.1. … international organizations (WHO, EU)? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
19.2. … Swiss national government? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
19.3. … local officials? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
19.4. … public health officials? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
19.5. … educational institutions (schools, universities)? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
20. How related or not do you think each of the following situations has been in the spread 











20.1. Too slow response from national governments and 
international organizations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
20.2. The minimization of coronavirus risks by certain politicians. 1 2 3 4 5 
20.3. Younger people continued to socially gather even after the 
first restrictions 
1 2 3 4 5 
20.4. Older people continued to go out even after the first 
restrictions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
20.5. The people, in general, are not taking the coronavirus 
contagion risks seriously. 









Finally, this section will cover some questions about your socio-demographic profile.  
 
21. What gender do you identify as?  
 
Female      1 
Male      2 





22. How old are you? 
 
23. How would you describe your current household financial situation? 
 
Live comfortably  1 
Meet my basic expenses with a little left over for extras  2 
Just meet my basic expense 3 
Don't even have enough to make basic expenses 4 
Don’t know 5 
 
24. In which educational institution do you mainly study/work right now?  
    Please indicate: 
  
 
25. What is your current main field of study or work? 
    Please indicate: 
  
 
End of the survey. 
 
 
We greatly appreciate your help in completing this survey! 























Papier auto-administré questionnaire d'enquête.  




Enquête sur les 
Affaires Sociales Actuelles 
 
Cette enquête est réalisée dans le cadre d’une recherche de Maîtrise sur l’opinion publique à 
l’Université de Lausanne. Vos réponses nous aideront à mieux comprendre les opinions et les 
impressions que les individus ont sur différents phénomènes sociaux et politiques. 
 
Votre participation est entièrement volontaire, vos réponses sont anonymes et tous les 
renseignements demeureront entièrement confidentiels. 
INSTRUCTIONS GÉNÉRALES 
Veuillez lire les instructions et chacune des questions attentivement. Il n’y a pas de "bonne" ou 
de "mauvaise" réponse, donc nous vous invitons à répondre aussi spontanément et 
sincèrement que possible. 
Répondre à chaque question en cochant une case  avec l’option qui représente au mieux 
votre opinion. Habituellement, la première réponse qui me vient à l’esprit est la plus fidèle. 
 
Si vous avez des questions, n’hésitez pas à contacter : 
Chercheur :  Daniela Chacón-Mendoza 
daniela.chaconmendoza@unil.ch 
Superviseur : Prof. Christian Staerklé, Institute of Psychology, UNIL 
 
Merci d’avoir accepté de participer à cette étude ! 
Avril 2020  
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Pour chacune des questions suivantes, veuillez répondre en cochant une case  avec l’option 
qui représente au mieux votre opinion. 
1. Quel intérêt avez-vous pour la politique ? 
 
Très intéressé 1 
Assez intéressé 2 
Peu intéressé 3 
Pas du tout intéressé 4 
 
2. Il y a plusieurs moyens de participer à la vie politique en Suisse. Durant les 12 derniers 
mois, avez-vous participé à l’une des activités suivantes ? 
 Oui Non 
2.1 Un parti politique, un mouvement social, ou un groupe d’action ? 1 0 
2.2 Une grève ou une manifestation publique ? 1 0 
 
3. Avez-vous voté à la dernière élection parlementaire au Conseil National Suisse du 20 
octobre 2019 ? 
Non 0 
Oui 1 
N’a pas le droit 3 
 
4. D'une manière générale, dans quelle mesure diriez-vous que vous êtes heureux de nos 
jours ? Veuillez donner une réponse entre 0 et 10, où 0 signifie ‘très malheureux’ et 10 signifie ‘très 
heureux’. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
                        Très malheureux                      Très heureux 
5. En prenant tout en compte, en générale, dans quelle mesure êtes-vous satisfait ou 
insatisfait de … 
 
5.1. …votre vie ? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
5.2. …la manière dont la démocratie fonctionne en 
Suisse ? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
5.3. …la manière dont le gouvernement suisse (Conseil 
Fédéral) fait son travail ? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 








6. Diriez-vous que l'on peut généralement faire confiance à la plupart des personnes ou que 





7. Diriez-vous que la plupart des gens tenteraient de profiter de vous s'ils en avaient 






8. Sur un score compris entre de 0 et 10, où 0 signifie ‘pas du tout confiance’ et 10 
‘complètement confiance’, à quel point faites-vous confiance, le cas échéant, aux 
informations que vous pouvez obtenir par le biais... 
 
 
8.1. …des organisations nationales des médias 
d'information ? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
8.2. …des plateformes de médias sociaux, comme 
Facebook, Twitter ou Snapchat ? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
8.3. …des amis et famille ? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
9. Encore une fois, sur un score compris entre 0 et 10, à quel point faites-vous confiance, le 
cas échéant, à chacune des institutions suivantes ? 
   
9.1 Le Parlement suisse (Conseil National et Conseil 
des États) ? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
9.2 Les partis politiques suisses ? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
9.3 Les politicien·ne·s suisses ? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 




0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
La plupart des gens 
tenteraient de profiter de moi 
La plupart des gens 
essayeraient de rester corrects 
Pas du tout 
confiance 
On n'est jamais 
trop prudent 
On peut faire confiance à 









10. Dans cette section, nous aimerions savoir dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord ou en 
désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes ? Veuillez fournir une réponse dans chacun des cinq 
éléments suivants. 











Tout à fait 
d’accord 
10.1 Il est important pour d'écouter les personnes qui sont 
différents de moi. Même quand je ne suis pas d'accord avec 
eux, je cherche cependant à les comprendre. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10.2 Dans une démocratie, il est important de faire des 
compromis entre différents points de vue. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10.3 Accepter des différentes opinions et/ou opposées signifie 
finalement que je devrai me battre pour mes propres 
croyances. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10.4 En général, on peut faire confiance aux gens ordinaires 
pour comprendre les problèmes de notre nation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10.5 Notre pays serait mieux gouverné si les décisions 
importantes n'étaient prises que par des professionnels et 
des experts. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
11. En politique, les personnes parlent parfois de ‘gauche’ et de ‘droite’. Où est-ce que vous 
situeriez-vous sur cette échelle, où 0 signifie ‘radical-gauche’ et 10 signifie ‘radical-
droite’? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
                         Radical-Gauche                    Radical-Droite 
12. Vous trouverez ci-dessous différentes déclarations sur les politiciens et la participation 
d’individus dans la vie politique. Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord 
avec chacun des éléments suivants ?  











Tout à fait 
d’accord 
12.1. Les politiciens perdent très vite le contact avec le peuple 1 2 3 4 5 
12.2. Les politiciens parlent trop et prennent trop peu de mesures. 1 2 3 4 5 
12.3. Des gens comme moi n'ont aucune influence sur ce que fait le 
gouvernement. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12.4. En général, les gens ordinaires ont un caractère bon et 
honnête. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12.5. La plupart des gens ordinaires partagent des valeurs et des 
intérêts similaires. 















Tout à fait 
d’accord 
12.6. Bien que les Suisses soient très différents les uns des autres, 
quand il s'agit de décisions vraiment importantes sur le 
fonctionnement de la société, ils ont tous tendance à penser 
de la même façon. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12.7. Le peuple devrait avoir le dernier mot sur les questions 
politiques les plus importantes en votant directement sur 
elles lors de référendums. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12.8. Le peuple devrait être consulté lorsque des décisions 
importantes sont prises. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12.9. C’est le peuple, et non les politiciens, qui devraient prendre 
nos décisions politiques les plus importantes. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
13. On peut avoir différentes opinions sur ce qui rend une société juste ou injuste. Dans quelle 
















13.1.  Je pense que, dans l’ensemble, les gens ont ce qu’ils méritent. 1 2 3 4 5 
13.2. Une société est juste quand elle prend soin des personnes 
pauvres et dans le besoin, indépendamment de ce qu’elles 
donnent en retour à la société. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13.3. Une société est juste lorsque les personnes qui travaillent dur 
sont correctement récompensées pour leurs efforts. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13.4. Une société est juste quand les personnes issues de familles au 
statut social élevé jouissent de privilèges. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13.5. Une société est juste lorsque la richesse est uniformément 
redistribuée entre toutes les personnes. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13.6. Pour qu'une société soit juste, les différences de niveau de vie 
entre les personnes devraient être faibles. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13.7. De grandes différences de revenus entre les personnes sont 
acceptables pour récompenser convenablement les différences 
de talents et d'efforts de chacun. 





Dans cette section, nous aimerions connaître vos impressions générales sur des affaires 
politiques spécifiques, en particulier le populisme. 
 
Le populisme fait référence à une manière de penser politique qui oppose les ‘gens 
ordinaires’ à ‘l'establishment’ ou à ‘l'élite’. De nombreux partis politiques et 
mouvements sociaux, de gauche et de droite, ont adopté des idées et des discours 
populistes, prétendant représenter la volonté du peuple. 
 
14. Dans les questions suivantes, nous vous montrerons une liste d'adjectifs opposés appariés. 
Veuillez cocher la case  qui se rapproche le plus de votre propre impression sur les 
mouvements et partis populistes de droite et de gauche 
 
14.1 Pour vous, en général, les partis ou mouvements populistes de droite tels que le 
BREXIT (UK), Union Démocratique du Centre (Suisse) ou le Parti Républicain dirigé par 
Donald Trump (États-Unis) sont ? 
 Très Quelque peu 





Dangereux  -2 -1 0 1 2 Inoffensifs 
Honnêtes  -2 -1 0 1 2 Malhonnête 
Intolérants  -2 -1 0 1 2 Tolérants 
Respectable  -2 -1 0 1 2 Non Respectable 
Qualifié  -2 -1 0 1 2 Non Qualifié 
Émotionnel  -2 -1 0 1 2 Rationnel 
Optimiste  -2 -1 0 1 2 Pessimiste 
 
14.2 Pour vous, en général, les partis ou mouvements populistes de gauche tels que 
Podemos (Espagne), La France Insoumise dirigée par Jean-Luc Mélenchon (France) ou le 
candidat du Parti Démocrate Bernie Sanders (US) sont ? 
 Très Quelque peu 





Pessimiste  -2 -1 0 1 2 Optimiste 
Émotionnel  -2 -1 0 1 2 Rationnel 
Tolérants  -2 -1 0 1 2 Intolérants 
Inoffensifs  -2 -1 0 1 2 Dangereux 
Respectable  -2 -1 0 1 2 Non Respectable 
Malhonnête  -2 -1 0 1 2 Honnêtes 




15. Dans quelle mesure est-il important pour vous de vivre dans un pays gouverné 
démocratiquement ? Sur une échelle de 0 à 10, où 0 signifie que ce n’est ‘pas du tout 






16. Maintenant, nous allons vous présenter quelques paires de courtes déclarations. Veuillez 

































Le populisme menace la démocratie. 
 
-2 -1 0 1 2 
Le populisme protège la démocratie. 
       
Le populisme est bon pour la 
démocratie. 
 
-2 -1 0 1 2 
Le populisme est mauvais pour la 
démocratie. 
       
Nous devons essayer de préserver la 
démocratie comme elle fonctionne 
actuellement en Suisse. 
 
-2 -1 0 1 2 
Nous devons essayer de changer la 
démocratie comme elle fonctionne 
actuellement en Suisse. 
       
Les démocraties devraient interdire 
les partis et mouvements populistes 
radicaux. 
 
-2 -1 0 1 2 
Les démocraties doivent permettre 
aux partis et mouvements populistes, 
même si elles sont radicales. 
 
17. Dans cette section, veuillez indiquer dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord ou en 
désaccord avec chacune des affirmations suivantes ? 











Tout à fait 
d’accord 
17.1. Je me sens privé quand je pense à ce que j'ai, par rapport à 
ce que d'autres personnes comme moi ont. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17.2. Je me sens privilégiée par rapport à d'autres personnes 
comme moi. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17.3. Je me sens insatisfait de ce que j'ai par rapport à ce que 
d'autres personnes comme moi ont. 
1 2 3 4 5 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Absolument 
important 




Cette section présentera quelques questions concernant l'épidémie de coronavirus (COVID-19). 
 
18. Quelle est l'ampleur de la menace, le cas échéant, que représente l'épidémie de coronavirus 
(COVID-19) pour… 
 Très haut Haute Modérée Faible  Très faible 
18.1. … votre santé personnelle et familiale ? 1 2 3 4 5 
18.2. … la situation financière de votre ménage ? 1 2 3 4 5 
 
19. Dans l'ensemble, dans quelle mesure êtes-vous satisfait ou insatisfait de la réponse à 
l'éclosion de coronavirus (COVID-19) donnée par…  
 
 
19.1. … des organisations internationales (OMS, UE) ? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
19.2. … gouvernement national Suisse ? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
19.3. … des autorités locales ? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
19.4. … des autorités de la santé publique ? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
19.5. … des établissements d’enseignement (écoles, 
universités) ? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
20. Dans quelle mesure pensez-vous que chacune des situations suivantes est liée ou non à la 








Pas du tout 
lié 
20.1. Réponse trop lente des gouvernements nationaux et des 
organisations internationales. 
1 2 3 4 5 
20.2. La minimisation des risques liés au coronavirus par certains 
politiciens et certaines politiciennes. 
1 2 3 4 5 
20.3. Les jeunes ont continué à se rassembler socialement même 
après les premières restrictions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
20.4. Les personnes âgées ont continué de sortir même après les 
premières restrictions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
20.5. Les personnes, en général, ne prennent pas au sérieux les 
risques de contagion des coronavirus. 











Enfin, cette section abordera quelques questions concernant votre profil sociodémographique. 
 
21. À quel genre vous identifiez-vous ?  
 
Femme      1 
Homme      2 





22. Quel âge avez-vous ? 
 
23. Comment décririez-vous la situation financière actuelle de votre ménage ? 
 
Vivre confortablement  1 
Faire face aux mes dépenses de base avec un peu sur le côté les extras 2 
Il suffit de répondre à mes dépenses de base 3 
Même pas assez pour faire les dépenses de base 4 
Ne sait pas 5 
 
24. Dans quel établissement d’enseignement vous étudier/travailler principalement en ce 
moment ?  
    Veuillez indiquer : 
  
 
25. Actuellement, quel est votre principal domaine d’études ou de travail actuel ? 
    Veuillez indiquer : 
  
 
Fin de l'enquête. 
 
Nous apprécions infiniment votre aide pour répondre à cette enquête ! 







Merci encore ! 
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APPENDIX C. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS & DATA PRIVACY 
Ethical Considerations 
 The anticipation of ethical dilemmas in scientific research that deals with human beings, is 
essential to provide credibility and authenticity. For this reason, this section displays a set of 
requirements following the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 
 Due to the nature of the research, no social experiments nor biomedical procedures were 
performed. In addition, no affectation or modification of personal environments, neither people's 
work nor psychological status was compromised as a result of the participant's provision of 
information; this was ensured by the pre-tests of the survey questionnaires. 
 Clear and summarized explanations of the research purposes and methods will be reported 
to all participants, including information of the non-commercial involved organizations, the 
procedures of protection and confidential treatment of the data, the participant selection, and how 
its contact information was obtained. 
 The general research design and process of data collection will guarantee free voluntary, 
anonymous participation. All participants, before taking part in the research, will be asked to give 
an "Informed Consent" that will approve their involvement and use of the information for the 
research stated purposes. 
 The participants' data collection will be limited by the general objective of the research 
project and will be processed only under those purposes; its access will also be restricted only to 
authorized researchers. Likewise, integrity and confidentiality of the respondents and the provided 
data will be secured by minimizing the respondent's identification data with the use of codes for 
anonymity; and the use of institutional, technical support and platforms protected and regulated by 
public national laws and scientific, ethical guidelines that will ensure private, secure processing 
and storage. 
 Transparency will be guaranteed by the public disclosure of the involved researchers, 
methodology and processing information throughout the development and finalization of the 
project, all of which will be available for demand, contact information will be display in case of 
questions or complaints. 
Survey Data Privacy Statement 
 This survey is published and managed by Daniela Chacón-Mendoza, Master student of the 
Public Opinion and Survey Methodology Program at the University of Lausanne (UNIL), with the 
supervision of Prof. Christian Staerklé from the Institute of Psychology (UNIL). 
 The following statement presents the essential information regarding the handling of the 
data collected through this survey. Please be aware that we take every reasonable effort to comply 
with ethical and data protection regulations. 
 All of the information collected would be entirely used for academic research purposes 
with no intent of commercialization.  
 Respondents' participation is completely voluntary, anonymous, and all the information 




1. Survey general objective:  
 The survey intends to explore the general views and perceptions of current political and 
social issues in the Swiss and international context about topics concerned with political 
participation, government, justice, satisfaction with life and the government, populism, COVID-
19, among others.  
 Additionally, it collects general demographic characteristics of the target population, i.e., 
students and graduate professionals (e.g., doctorate students and pos-doctoral researchers) 
associated with Swiss universities and institutes of technology (UIT). 
 
2. Information collected and technical details:  
Identification data 
 The data collected and processed is contextual data, such as gender, age, and views on a 
variety of social and political issues, among others, required for a consequential analysis of the 
survey objectives. No identifying data is collected for purposes of the study. 
As an incentive of participation, a link for an opportunity to voluntarily enter a lottery, to win a 20 
CHF gift-card, is presented at the end of the survey questionnaire.  
 The link provided gives access to a separate form that requests for an institutional email 
address; this contact information is stored in an entirely different database that in no way could be 
associated to the survey responses.  
 
 
Technical information  
 The web-tool used to collect survey responses is LimeSurvey Software, which provides 
accessibility of survey design and technical delivery and is compliant with the European Union 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR); in effect since 25 May 2018.  
 Regular e-mail-addresses and social media posts are used for the survey distribution where 
an URL gives access to the survey questionnaire. Any contact information is stored or managed 
entirely separate from the survey responses delivered. 
 To make possible the safe functionality of the online survey, and to prevent repeated 
participation, a cookie is turned on, by the survey web-server.  
3. Access to the information: 
 The access to the information collected in the context of this survey is only granted through 
User ID/Password to the survey administrator: Daniela Chacón-Mendoza (UNIL). 
 The information can be disclosed solely in an anonymous form and for academic research 
purposes and research dissemination. 
4. Information protection: 
 The collected survey data is exclusively hosted/stored on a server in Germany provided by 
the Lime Survey Professional hosting service. Lime Survey and the server location comply fully 
with the General Data Protection Regulation.  
5. Contact information: 
 In case of any questions regarding the survey, or concerning information processed in the 
context of the study, please contact: 
Daniela Chacón-Mendoza 





APPENDIX D. OPERATIONALIZATION 
Table 9. Alignment matrix of Research Questions, Variables and Questionnaire 
Items 
Research Question 1: How do individuals’ rate on anti-populist attitudes? 


















Please, indicate which statement comes closer to your own view?  
Populism threatens democracy | Populism protects democracy 
Populism is good for democracy | Populism is bad for democracy 
*Dangerous | Harmless  
Morality of Conduct  
*Honest | Dishonest  
*Emotional | Rational 
Tolerance *Intolerant | Tolerant 
Behavioral 
Competence 
*Respectable | Unrespectable 
*Qualified | Unqualified 
Cynicism *Optimistic | Pessimistic 
Status-Quo 
Please, indicate which statement comes closer to your own view?  
We should try to preserve democracy as is currently working in 
Switzerland | 
We should try to change democracy as is currently working in 
Switzerland 
Democracies should ban populist parties and movements that are 
radical | 
Democracies should allow populist parties and movements even if 
they are radical.  
* This item was asked two separate times one referencing right-wing populist parties and another one referencing 
left-wing populist parties. The respective questions are the following:  
- For you, in general, right-wing populist parties or movements such as 
BREXIT (UK), The Swiss People’s Party (Switzerland), or The Republican Party lead by Donald Trump (US) 
are?  
- For you, in general, left-wing populist parties or movements such as Podemos (Spain), La France Insoumise 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX E. ANTI-POPULISM 
Table 10. PAF for Items Measuring Anti-Populist Attitudes (N=304). 
   Factors      
N° Item  1 2 3 4 5 h2 M SD 
1 rw4 
Right-wing populist parties or movements 
are unrespectable .789 -.259 .117   .533 4.28 .888 
2 rw2 
Right-wing populist parties or movements 
are dishonest .722  .197 -.286  .543 4.08 .967 
3 rw5 
Right-wing populist parties or movements 
are unqualified .719 -.119   -.134 .265 4.06 1.309 
4 rw1 
Right-wing populist parties or movements 
are dangerous .611 -.27 .21 -.156 .124 .597 3.94 .978 
5 rw6 
Right-wing populist parties or movements 
are emotional .435 .115 .111   .482 3.65 1.073 
6 rw3 
Right-wing populist parties or movements 
are intolerant .425 -.114 .115 -.107 .219 .22 3.75 1.276 
7 lw5 
Left-wing populist parties or movements 
are unrespectable  .779  .21 -.134 .129 3.61 1.025 
8 lw6 
Left-wing populist parties or movements 
are dishonest -.173 .694  .151  .201 2.69 1.019 
9 lw7 
Left-wing populist parties or movements 
are unqualified  .667    .219 3.6 1.07 
10 lw4 
Left-wing populist parties or movements 
are dangerous -.127 .631  .18  .375 2.4 1.192 
11 lw3 
Left-wing populist parties or movements 
are intolerant  .57  .327  .424 2.77 .938 
12 lw2 
Left-wing populist parties or movements 
are emotional  .419   .29 .55 2.37 .972 
13 apop2 Populism is bad for democracy .278  .872  -.111 .469 2.62 .954 
14 apop1 Populism threatens democracy  .385 .108 .67   .373 2.72 .911 
15 lw1 
Left-wing populist parties or movements 
are pessimistic  .267  .524  .566 3.64 1.047 
16 apop3 
We should try to preserve democracy as is 
currently working in Switzerland    .157  .538 3.51 1.087 
17 rw7 
Right-wing populist parties or movements 
are pessimistic  .238    .371 .071 3.58 1.251 
18 apop4 
Democracies should ban populist parties 
and movements that are radical     -.262 .095 2.71 1.158 
 Explained variance 59% 25% 16% 7% 6% 6%    
 Eigenvalues 4.44 2.83 1.21 1.05 1.04    
 Cronbach’s Alpha .77 .79       
  Note. Factor analysis applying principle axis method and varimax rotation; factor loadings lower 
than .1 were suppressed; KMO = .81; N = 304.  
 
105 
APPENDIX F. REGRESSION ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS DIAGNOSIS
Anti Right-Wing Hierarchical Multiple Regression Assumptions Diagnosis 
Homoscedasticity  
 
Figure 7. Anti Right-Wing Populism Standardized Residuals Scatterplot (N=301) 
Normally distributed residuals 
 




Figure 9. Anti Right-Wing Populism Standardized Residuals Q-Q Plot (N=301) 
Anti Left-Wing Hierarchical Multiple Regression Assumptions Diagnosis 
Homoscedasticity  
 







Normally distributed residuals 
 
 
Figure 11. Anti Left-Wing Populism Standardized Residuals Histogram (N=300) 
 
 
Figure 12. Anti Left-Wing Populism Standardized Residuals Q-Q Plot (N=300)
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